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I. Introduction
Corporations typically retain statutory personal rights with
respect to commercial activity, such as the rights to own property,
to sue and be sued, and to enter into contracts.1 But the extent to
which corporations have constitutional personal rights, such as
the right to free speech,2 is the source of debate among courts,
legislatures, citizens, the legal academy, and, of course,
corporations.
The academic community has analyzed corporations—
particularly their essence, rights, and purposes—throughout
their evolution. Corporate law encompasses many theories, and
virtually every theory either aims to answer any of three basic
questions or presumes a position on those questions in order to
tackle a more nuanced issue.3 These three questions, therefore,
are a defining feature of corporate theory as an area of study.
First, what is a corporation’s essence? Most theories describe
a corporation’s essence in terms of one of two metaphors: an
entity that exists separately from its shareholders or a mere
aggregation of the corporation’s constituents.4 This Note will refer
to this distinction as the corporate-essence dichotomy.
1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(4) (2012) (providing a
corporation’s right to own property); id. § 122(2) (stating that a corporation may
sue and be sued); id. § 122(13) (providing a corporation’s right to contract); see
also 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (stating that, in congressional acts, the word “person”
presumptively includes corporations).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”).
3. Although this Note categorizes the theories by how they answer certain
questions, scholars conceptualize corporate theories in many different ways
because the theories and their interrelation are complicated. See, e.g., Susanna
K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 97 (2009)
(providing a different organization of theories).
4. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201
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Second, what are the rights of a corporation? Many theories
presume or posit that corporations represent either artificial
creations of state law, thereby only possessing such rights as are
explicitly granted by statute, or natural products of private
initiative, thereby possessing rights beyond those granted by
statute.5 This Note will refer to this distinction as the corporaterights dichotomy.
Third, what are the purposes and goals of corporations? Some
theories argue that corporations are mechanisms purely for
private investment, aiming to maximize shareholder wealth.
Other theories assert that corporations are vehicles both for
private investment and for broader, public purposes, considering
also the betterment of the economy and society.6 This Note will
refer to this distinction as the corporate-purpose dichotomy.
Often, intimately tied to this final question is an analysis of the
balance of power between shareholders and the board of directors
because that balance seems to indicate how corporations ought to
be governed.7 This Note, however, will not discuss particular
governance theories because they implicitly answer one of the
three main questions common to virtually all corporate-law
(1990) (distinguishing the corporation as an entity from that as “a mere
aggregation of natural individuals without a separate existence”).
5. See Daniel Lipton, Note, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics:
Defining Corporate Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 VA. L.
REV. 1911, 1915 (2010) (discussing the real-entity and artificial-entity theories
of corporate personhood) (citations omitted). Lipton uses the phrase “conclusions
about the nature of corporate personhood” to mean rights derived from some
corporate essence. Id.
6. See Millon, supra note 4, at 201 (discussing a development in corporate
theory focusing on a public–private distinction about “the nature of corporate
activity and the appropriate goals of corporate law”). “According to one view,
corporate activity has broad social and political ramifications that justify a body
of corporate law that is deliberately responsive to public interest concerns. The
alternative viewpoint portrays corporate law as governing little more than the
private relations between the shareholders of the corporation and
management . . . .” Id.
7. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of
Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1396 (2008) (introducing the “nexus of
contracts” theory, the “team production” theory, and the “shareholder primacy”
theory as answering the question, “[W]hose interests are corporate decisionmakers to pursue?”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (discussing
different theories about the means of corporate governance in terms of the
division of power between the board and shareholders).
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theories, and thus fall within the general discussion of this Note.8
Because of the importance of personal rights and the public
attention to corporate personal rights, this Note focuses on the
second of the three questions—the corporate-rights dichotomy—
but also heavily implicates the first question, the corporateessence dichotomy.
In 2010, Citizens United v. FEC9 stirred debate of
corporations’ personal rights under the U.S. Constitution.10 The
U.S. Supreme Court concluded, first, that “the Government may
not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s
corporate identity.”11 Second, the Court overruled a law that
prohibited corporate independent campaign expenditures on the
grounds that the law was a ban on speech violating the First
Amendment.12 The Court had already held, in a previous case,
that speech could not be restricted solely because the speaker was
a corporation,13 but the effect of Citizens United—that
corporations may now spend unlimited funds advocating the
success or defeat of candidates under the protection of the First

8. For example, the nexus-of-contracts theory, which views the corporate
power structure as an aggregation of private interests, implicitly answers the
corporate-essence question: the corporation must be an aggregation, not an
entity. See Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation: More Than a
Nexus-of-Contracts, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 209, 215 (2011) (“The aggregate theory is
generally understood to capture the nexus-of-contracts view, the artificial-entity
theory captures concession theory, and the real-entity theory arguably captures
the director-primacy view of the corporation.” (citation omitted)); Reuven S. AviYonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, in 1 ACCOUNTING, ECONOMICS,
AND LAW 1, 25 n.142 (2011) (“The point that the nexus-of-contracts theory is a
reinvention of the aggregate view has been made repeatedly.”).
9. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
10. See id. at 913–16 (stating that the government could not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity and that a
federal statute barring corporate expenditures for campaigns violated the First
Amendment).
11. Id. at 913.
12. Id. at 896–98.
13. See id. at 913 (relying on previous U.S. Supreme Court holdings that
restricting campaign expenditures amounts to a restriction on speech and that
the government may not restrict corporate speech); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (holding that a Massachusetts statute
prohibiting certain corporate political expenditures violates the First
Amendment).
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Amendment—has itself sparked considerable discourse among
the media and the general public.14
One source of public concern is that corporate entities can
overwhelm the voices of individual citizens by pouring their
amassed wealth into lobbying efforts and media ownership.15
Indeed, if corporations dominate both the media and elected
offices, they can essentially control policy and law. Even private
business owners or wealthy individuals typically cannot rival a
large corporation’s resources.16 Such power is self-perpetuating
because corporations can then use their influence to enhance
their own wealth-seeking interests.17 Thus, members of the public
often fear that corporations will have a corruptive influence on
government officials.18
14. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Corporate Sponsorship Is Campaign Issue on
Which Both Parties Can Agree, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2010, at A15 (providing
poll results and statements of political figures who oppose unlimited corporate
campaign expenditure); Alex Blumberg, Forget Stocks or Bonds, Invest in a
Lobbyist, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/
2012/01/06/144737864/forget-stocks-or-bonds-invest-in-a-lobbyist (last visited
Jan. 8, 2012) (reporting results of a study showing a corporate tax benefit of
$220 on every dollar spent lobbying for the benefit) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Jason Potteiger, ‘Occupiers’ Reflect on Movement One
Year Later, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/13/
161103621/occupiers-reflect-on-movement-on-year-later (last visited Sept. 28,
2012) (“[W]e want a constitutional amendment to reverse Citizens United or we
want to end corporate personhood.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
15. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert
Murdoch Problem, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1628 (1999) (listing major corporations
that own corporate media subsidiaries such as ABC, NBC, and FOX News).
16. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010) (refusing to
recognize a government interest in corporations’ having an unfair advantage by
using “resources amassed in the economic marketplace” (quoting Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990))).
17. See Supplemental Brief Amicus Curiae of the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press in Support of Appellant, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876, 904 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2219299 at *2–3 (“The original,
laudable intent of Congress presumably was to limit speech by corporations that
seek to promote their own interests by influencing elections, while continuing to
allow all other commentary (either non-corporate entities or by the news media)
on political issues.”).
18. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908 (addressing and rejecting the
argument that the government has a sufficiently important interest in
preventing corruption, based on corporate independent expenditures, of elected
officials).

2176

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2171 (2012)

In Citizens United, however, the Federal Judiciary—the only
Branch structurally insulated from political influence19—
defended corporations’ right to freely spend their funds on
electioneering communications under the highest protection of
the law.20 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected its earlier policybased position against the distorted corporate influence and
political corruption that would likely accompany unlimited
corporate campaign expenditures.21 The decision leaves
individual citizens and the legal community with the question:
What kind of person is a corporation, such that it can speak
under protection of the Constitution?
Central to the debate, and the focus of this Note, is how
Citizens United has affected corporate personhood in theory and
in practice. In particular, the public’s criticism of the 2010 case
amplifies the flaw in the idea that we can deduce traits from a
corporate person or essence—a notion that is fundamental to
corporate-rights theories.22 Additionally, Citizens United
indicates the U.S. Supreme Court’s stance on justifying corporate
rights.
This Note focuses exclusively on publicly held businesses
because the corporate rights debate primarily raises issues with
the influence and standard characteristics of large-scale
enterprises. The idea of corporate personhood does not raise the
same questions with closely held companies whose owners also
retain control over decisionmaking.23
Part II of this Note discusses theories about characteristics of
the corporate form prior to Citizens United, arising out of the
entity and aggregate theories of corporate form (the corporate19. Federal judges are theoretically insulated from the politics involved in
elected offices and nontenured positions. See Girardeau A. Spann, Expository
Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 636 (1983) (“[The Judiciary] has been insulated
purposely from immediate political accountability.”).
20. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (applying constitutional
protections and a strict-scrutiny analysis to state that corporate independent
expenditures are permissible).
21. See id. at 902−11 (overruling precedent that permits a ban on political
speech under the “antidistortion” and “anticorruption” rationales).
22. See infra Part II (discussing corporate-rights theories).
23. See Bruner, supra note 7, at 1386 n.1 (implying that issues arise from
the separation of ownership and control, which is characteristic of publicly held
businesses rather than those that are closely held).
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essence dichotomy).24 This Part then raises two important
critiques of these theories that resurface in later discussion.25
Part III analyzes the Citizens United opinion as it relates to
corporate-rights theories and its repercussions in law and
society.26 Part IV revives the two critiques from Part II to reject
the notion that rights can be deduced from any theoretical
conception of the corporation.27 Because no corporate-law theories
can provide an appropriate source from which the U.S. Supreme
Court can ascribe rights to the corporation, this Part then
identifies the proper source.28 Specifically, the opinion’s language
suggests that the Court grounds the right to corporate political
speech in public policy.29 Finally, based on this refined reading of
Citizens United, Part V provides more accurate bases for
criticizing the opinion or otherwise addressing the public’s
concerns.30
Part VI concludes by reiterating the overarching argument of
this Note: (1) Citizens United is unclear about the source of the
corporate political speech right; (2) because the Court fails to
make the source clear, public criticism of Citizens United is
misguided; (3) the source for the constitutional corporate speech
right is public policy, not some existential truth about the
corporate form; and (4) real, functional claims about corporate
rights only relate to corporate-rights theories in the sense that
these theories are metaphors to discuss the real rights.31

24. See infra Part II.A (discussing entity and aggregate theories).
25. See infra Part II.B (discussing the circularity problem).
26. See infra Part III (discussing Citizens United).
27. See infra Part IV (finding a fatal flaw in using entity and aggregate
theories to deduce corporate rights).
28. See infra Part IV (finding the real source of the corporate speech right).
29. See infra Part IV (dissecting Citizens United to find the source of the
corporate speech right).
30. See infra Part V (describing a proper analysis).
31. See infra Part VI (concluding that the Court failed in its duty to justify
the right of corporate political speech by not clearly explaining its source).
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II. Corporate Form Pre-Citizens United
A. Entity and Aggregate Theories of Corporate Form

By the nineteenth century, corporate America began to
develop from joint stock trading companies and partnerships into
quasi-public entities.32 As legislators and courts unequivocally
granted corporate entities rights that, by statute, explicitly
applied to persons,33 complex corporate-law questions led
theorists to contemplate the ontology of the corporate legal
Generally,
nineteenth-century
theories
personality.34
conceptualized the corporate form either as an entity separate
from its shareholders or as an aggregate of its members,35 and
theorists attempted to deduce inherent rights or characteristics
based on the corporate form.36
Under the artificial-entity theory of corporate personhood,
which “character[ized] . . . legal discourse for much of the 19th
century,”37 the corporation is a mere “creature of the law, whose
rights consist[] only of those conferred by the state.”38 The
32. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
PRIVATE PROPERTY 11 (rev. ed. 1968) (outlining the development of the
corporate form).
33. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–
1960, at 66–67 (1992) (discussing the impact of an 1886 U.S. Supreme Court
decision finding—without explanation—that “a corporation was a person under
the Fourteenth Amendment” (citing Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118
U.S. 394 (1886))).
34. See id. at 67, 70–76, 98–107 (discussing various theories of corporate
personhood developing around the turn of the nineteenth century).
35. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 3 & n.10 (stating that the
aggregate theory, the artificial-entity theory, and the real-entity theory are
“standard theories found in literature”). The essence of these theories can be
traced back to before the nineteenth century. See id. at 4–6 (discussing the
history of corporate theories). But the “shift from small, closely held enterprises
to massive, publicly held ones” led to a “re-examination of the corporate form”
under these three theories. Id. at 14.
36. See Bruner, supra note 7, at 1387–88 (describing Sir Edward Coke’s
theory that a corporation is an artificial legal person); Jess M. Krannich, The
Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of
Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 66–86 (2005) (providing
U.S. Supreme Court precedent for “the artificial-entity theory, the aggregate
entity theory, and the real-entity theory” (citations omitted)).
37. Millon, supra note 4, at 211.
38. Lipton, supra note 5, at 1915 (citations omitted).
AND
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corporate entity, under this view, is a legal fiction that exists only
to the extent that statutory law prescribes.39 When courts have
used language indicating an artificial-entity view, they typically
have distinguished the corporate entity from its members to
justify state regulation, rather than to imbue the corporation
with rights.40
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the advent of
general incorporation laws facilitated widespread incorporation
by simplifying the state-law requirements, making the
corporation more universally available as a business form.41 At
the same time, these laws signified a shift away from the idea of
an artificial entity heavily regulated by the state.42 Theorists
recognized corporations as “nothing but aggregations of private
individuals,” as opposed to entities distinct from their
constituents.43 Under this aggregation theory, corporations have
rights derived from the rights of the natural persons behind the
corporate veil.44 Although not consistently adopting the aggregate
theory over entity theories, courts have applied constitutional
protections to corporations on the grounds that “the members do
not, because of such association, lose their rights to protection.”45

39. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)
(“Being the mere creature of law, [the corporation] possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it . . . .”); Millon, supra
note 4, at 206 (“[T]he corporation owed its existence to the positive law of the
state rather than to the private initiative of individual incorporators.”).
40. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (“[A corporation] has no
right to refuse to submit its books [for state review, but an] individual may
stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen.”).
41. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 75 (discussing how general
incorporation laws “allowed individuals to incorporate their businesses without
first seeking a special charter from the state legislature”); Avi-Yonah, supra
note 35, at 13 & n.75 (providing an example of general incorporation law).
42. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 75 (“The immediate effect of the
general incorporation acts was to ‘move[] the predominant role in corporate
organization from the state to the incorporators and shareholders.’” (citation
omitted)).
43. Millon, supra note 4, at 202.
44. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 77 (discussing how courts “imputed the
corporation’s constitutional personhood from that of the individuals who had
formed the corporation”).
45. See Cnty. Of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402–03 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1883).
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The turn of the twentieth century saw significant
developments in the corporate form, including corporations’
acquisition of several legal features that make the public
corporation an attractive entity form, as we know it today.46 For
example, limited shareholder liability and free transferability of
shares promote economic efficiency and investment by
encouraging risk taking and reducing transaction costs.47
Similarly, corporations’ perpetual existence incentivizes
investment.48 Perhaps most significantly, companies with widely
dispersed ownership vest control in boards of directors—rather
than in their expanding base of shareholders, whose interest in
the company becomes so insignificant that they, rationally, are
apathetic about business decisions.49
The ownership–control dichotomy, which divides the
corporate identity between its directors and shareholders,
coincided with the growing popularity of a third theory in
legislative, judicial, and academic discourse about the corporate
form.50 The idea of the corporation as a state-created artificial
46. See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 72–74 (discussing “fundamental
changes . . . in the legal treatment of the corporation”); see also STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 4–11 (2002) (describing the
essential attributes of the corporation and, as applicable, referring to their
formal codification); Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate
Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889, 891 & n.9 (2006) (listing attributes of the
corporation) (citations omitted).
47. See David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited
Liability Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for
Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the
Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 439 (1998) (“Limited liability
promotes the free transfer of shares, which creates incentives for managers to
act efficiently since the results of their inefficient actions will be punished by the
market.” (citing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 42−43 (1991))).
48. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2005) (“Unless its articles of
incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation has perpetual
duration . . . and has the same powers as an individual to do all things
necessary or convenient to carry out its business . . . .”).
49. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 32, at 84–85, 108–16 (discussing the
separation of ownership and control among large-scale corporations).
50. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 98 (discussing the emergence of
the natural-entity theory, which recognized a distinction between the corporate
entity and the shareholders); Cohen, supra note 47, at 435–36 (“[T]he growing
size of firms and the recognition of the separation of ownership and control in
firms resulted in commentators arguing that firms were somehow independent
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entity gave way to a description of a corporation as an entity
arising naturally by private initiative.51 Coupled with the
separation of ownership and control, these theoretical
developments “transformed shareholders from entrepreneurs into
passive investors who placed their economic interests in the
hands of professional managers.”52 This advent of the naturalentity theory (or real-entity theory) accompanied corporations’
growth in size and pervasiveness, leading to a corporate structure
that has persisted as “the dominant form of organization and
production.”53 Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah has deemed this
theory the most persistent of corporate-rights theories, partly
because it is the “most congruent with business realities [such as
the business judgment rule] as well as the [theory] most suited to
a corporation–state balance.”54
The artificial-entity theory, the aggregate theory, and the
natural-entity theory each have sought to affirmatively describe
the corporate form, and this debate has in turn prompted
normative discussion among the academic community as to what
corporations ought to be.55 For example, the political-speech right
might appear to attach to corporations pursuant to a naturalentity perspective: corporations are entities whose speech the
U.S. Supreme Court has deemed protected, so they have the

of their owners.” (citing Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business
Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987))); see also Stephen
M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
671, 671–73 (1995) (identifying Berle and Means’s theory on separation of
ownership and control as a motivating tenet of “the modern era of corporate
governance scholarship”). See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 32
(discussing the separation of ownership and control in large corporations).
51. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 80 (describing the corporation as an
autonomous being with existence independent of its shareholders and beyond
state grant of authority); Millon, supra note 4, at 202 (“The aggregate
characterization did not prove to be persuasive, but the notion of the corporation
as a natural creation of private initiative and market forces replaced the idea
that the corporation was artificial.”).
52. Millon, supra note 4, at 214–15.
53. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 32, at xxv.
54. Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 19.
55. See Millon, supra note 4, at 204 (recognizing that “normative
implications then are said to follow from the positive assertion [of what
corporations are]”).
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capacity for speech.56 Natural-entity theorists (and the general
public) would then debate whether it is appropriate that
corporations have the capacity for speech already found to be
constitutionally protected.57
The vast majority of corporate-theory scholars, in discussing
corporations’ rights and the corporate form, adopt (at least
implicitly) the aggregate theory or one of the two entity
theories,58 despite each theory’s enduring inconsistencies.59
B. The Circularity of Defining a Corporation by Inherent
Characteristics
All three theories face a problem of circular reasoning.
Because the entity theories and the aggregate theory all describe
the essence of a corporation, they inevitably make claims about
attributes or rights of corporations.60 Attributes such as limited
shareholder liability, free transferability of shares, perpetual
existence, and centralized governance may seem to clearly define
the corporation. Corporations, however, like people, can have an
indefinite number of characteristics, some of which seem
inconsistent.61 For example, a corporation can sign a document

56. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (“[T]he
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's
corporate identity.”); Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 41 (“The entire Citizens United
opinion, both the majority and the dissent, are thus reflective of the real entity
view. Corporations stand on their own, independent of both the state that
created them and the shareholders that own them.”).
57. See Millon, supra note 4, at 204 (stating that normative implications
follow from positive assertions about corporations).
58. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 3 (“[T]hroughout all of [the changes in
the legal conception of the corporation], spanning two millennia, the same three
theories of the corporation can be discerned.”).
59. See infra notes 66–72 and accompanying text (pointing out major flaws
in the theories).
60. See H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 42 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1983) (“Theories of the traditional form . . . make the common
assumption that [expressions for corporate bodies] must stand for or describe
something, and then give separate and incompatible accounts of its peculiarity
as a complex or recondite or a fictitious entity . . . .”).
61. See id. (“[T]he peculiarity lies . . . in the distinctive characteristics of
expressions used in the enunciation and application of rules.”).
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(and we picture this as requiring a human agent)62 but cannot
swear an oath (though we could imagine a human proxy on the
stand).63 In fact, as corporations accumulate characteristics,
inconsistencies suggest confusion in the line of questioning
between asking about the corporation, on the one hand, and
asking about the people who comprise it, on the other hand.64
Although some scholars offer explanations for the “oscillation
between the three views” over time,65 the reality is that no single
theory can consistently define a corporation.66
Two inherent flaws prevent any entity or aggregate theory
from fully and accurately defining a corporation. First, each of the
two major categories distorts the corporate form in its own
direction: entity theories have trouble explaining rights arising
from the aggregate, and aggregate theories struggle with traits
arising from a holistic entity.67 Under an entity theory, deriving
personal rights on the corporation’s behalf may be difficult to
62. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2012) (“Every corporation organized
under this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and
duties . . . necessary to enable it to sign instruments . . . .”).
63. See Bruner, supra note 7, at 1388 (providing the seventeenth century
view that corporations do not possess bodies or souls and thus can neither “‘be in
person, nor swear’” an oath (quoting 5 EDWARD COKE, THE REPORTS OF SIR
EDWARD COKE, KNT.: IN THIRTEEN PARTS pt. X, at *32b (photo. reprint 2002)
(1826))).
64. See HART, supra note 60, at 43 (discussing group personalities, such as
“‘[t]he crowd was angry’”).
65. Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 17. “The Court is trying to strike a balance
between the rights of the corporations, which can best be protected under either
the aggregate or the real entity views, and the regulatory power of the state,
which is best reflected in the artificial entity view.” Id. at 17−18.
66. Hart provides examples of inconsistencies under the entity theories:
[J]ust as a Realist theory appears to tell us that a company “cannot”
be bound by an agreement empowering another company to direct its
business and appoint its personnel because this would be “to degrade
to the position of a tool” a person with a real will, so a Fiction theory
appears to say that company “cannot” be guilty of certain crimes
because it has no mind.
HART, supra note 60, at 45 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Bruner, supra note 7,
at 1388–89 (criticizing the aggregate theory for its conclusion that “an
aggregation of souls equals no soul”, which “den[ies] the humanity of what is, in
essence, a collection of human actors”).
67. See HART, supra note 60, at 43 (“Under what conditions do we refer to
numbers . . . of men as aggregates of individuals and under what conditions do
we adopt instead unifying phrases extended by analogy from individuals?”).
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explain; the only sense in which a corporation can act on its
personal rights is via individual people, and if the corporation is
in fact a separate entity it arguably should be regulated as such.68
Under the aggregate theory, on the other hand, replacing a
corporation’s entire membership would seem to form a new
corporation.69 As corporations have developed over time, each
category of theories (aggregate theories and entity theories) faces
the same obstacle: it must “simultaneously recognize[] entity and
aggregate characteristics”70 and be somewhat “schizophrenic
about what ultimately the firm is.”71
The second inherent flaw in corporate-rights theories is that
defining a corporation by listing its characteristics presumes
corporations have inherent attributes that resemble those of
persons.72 Recognizing the circularity in this reasoning, H.L.A.
Hart concluded that statements about inherent characteristics do
not define a corporation; that would beg the question by defining
what a corporation is.73 Applying Hart’s theory, no corporate
essence exists from which to derive rights; rather, the legislatures
and courts must say what rights a corporation has.74 Therefore,
we must abandon the notion that a corporation can be defined by
its characteristics and instead ask the question: “Under what

68. See Cohen, supra note 47, at 435 (discussing the aggregate theory as
responding to the problem of government regulation of the corporate entity).
69. See Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV.
253, 259 (1911) (“Any group of men . . . whose membership is changing, is
necessarily an entity separate and distinct from the constituent members.”
(citation omitted)).
70. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1505 (1989) (criticizing the
commonality problem of aggregate and entity theories).
71. Cohen, supra note 47, at 436.
72. See HART, supra note 60, at 45 (“These statements [about corporations’
entity or ontological capacity] confuse the issue because they look like eternal
truths about the nature of corporations given us by definitions . . . .”); Bruner,
supra note 7, at 1388–89 (considering that there may not be an inherent soullike ontology of a corporate entity).
73. See HART, supra note 60, at 42–47 (discussing the definition of a
corporation).
74. See id. at 29–30 (analogizing the corporation to a game in which a rule
“attach[es] a single consequence to the successive actions of a set of different
men—as when a team is said to have won a game”).
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types of conditions does the law ascribe liabilities”—and rights—
“to corporations?”75
The circularity problem arises when answering the question
What is a corporation? by listing corporate rights as if they
naturally belong in the definition. The problem does not arise in
every discussion about corporate qualities. If the question is How
does a corporation function in the real world?, listing corporate
rights such as “corporations can sign contracts” is informative
and avoids the circularity problem. The claim is now helpful
because it identifies a corporate right.76 For example, identifying
which crimes a corporation is capable of committing reveals its
capacity as a legal device. Consider perjury: a corporate official
may lie under oath in his role as an agent of the corporation, yet
courts have held that the corporation is not a person capable of
taking an oath and cannot be criminally liable for the crime of
perjury.77 Therefore, legislatures and courts determine which
crimes a corporation could potentially commit.
Corporations seem suspect insofar as they retain, through
statutes or court decisions, certain humanlike capacities while
escaping moral and legal accountability for humanlike actions.78
If Congress and state legislatures (and courts, via judicial review)
make the rules, they cannot hide behind an ontological argument
to defend unpopular corporate traits. Legislatures and courts
seem unlikely to use these ontological theories as a cop-out,
75. Id. at 43. (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. See id. (stating that the discussion of the law ascribing rights to
corporations will “bring out the precise issues at stake when judges, who are
supposed not to legislate, make some new extension to corporate bodies of rules
worked out for individuals”).
77. See, e.g., State v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 835 So. 2d 230,
233–34 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (finding a corporation incapable of committing
perjury); Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations for Acts of Their Agents, 60
HARV. L. REV. 283, 284 (1946) (discussing corporations’ capacity to commit
crimes). But see United States v. Ingredient Tech. Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 99–100
(2d Cir. 1983) (concluding that a corporation could be convicted of subscribing to
a false federal income tax return even though it has been held that corporations
are incapable of taking an oath).
78. “The structure of the public corporation ‘insulates shareholders from
social and moral sanctions and processes,’ both by rendering them ‘largely
anonymous’ to the public, as well as by virtue of their ‘relative lack of
information about how corporate operations may impact the public interest.’”
Bruner, supra note 7, at 1393 (quoting Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 798 (2005)).
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however, but rather as a legal defense of the corporate rights they
determine. In a 1906 case, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a
corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth
Amendment, against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under
an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In
organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional
immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be
taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against
by due process of law, and is protected, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, against unlawful discrimination. Corporations
are a necessary feature of modern business activity, and their
aggregated capital has become the source of nearly all great
enterprises.79

The Court uses the aggregate view of the corporation as a means
to justify its application of the personal due process protection.80
Using the aggregate theory as a scapegoat would look more like:
We wish we could hold that a corporation is not entitled to
immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures, as
humans are, but we simply cannot because the corporation is an
association of individuals in all contexts. Legislatures’ and courts’
hiding behind an ontological theory to explain corporate rights,
then, is most likely a figment of the public’s imagination.
C. The Stance of the Courts
A common belief among corporate-law theorists is that
courts, before upholding a corporation’s constitutional rights,
examine the values and policies underlying those rights with
respect to individuals and determine whether those justifications
apply to corporations.81 Courts have performed this task in two
ways. The first reflects the circularity trap, as described above.82
79. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (citation omitted).
80. See id. (indicating that the corporation derives personal rights from its
being an association of individuals).
81. See, e.g., Krannich, supra note 36, at 64, 104–08 (positing that the U.S.
Supreme Court should analyze constitutional corporate rights “‘in light of the
values and policies that are thought to underlie it.’” (citation omitted)).
82. See supra Part II.B (explaining the circularity of presuming inherent
corporate characteristics).
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This occurs when courts use language that presumes the
existence of a truth-value for corporate characteristics, as if
corporations have inherent rights to be protected and we only
need to discover what they are.83 For example: Is it true that a
corporation has the capacity for speech?84 If so, perhaps corporate
speech merits constitutional protection. At times the U.S.
Supreme Court has adopted this view, most famously in Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward:85 “A corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”86
At other times, courts have not deduced corporate rights from
the essence of a corporation. In these cases, traits or rights often
attach to corporations simply based on courts’ interpretations of
statutory law.87 If not directly citing to statute, courts have
justified the attachment of a trait based on precedent or have
simply refused to elaborate on how or when a corporate trait
attaches.88 In Citizens United, for example, the Court supported
the premise that “First Amendment protection extends to
corporations” with a paragraph solely citing to case law, but with
no reference to when or how the right attached.89 The right most
83. See HART, supra note 60, at 45 (arguing that statements such as “‘[a]
company has no mind and therefore cannot intend’ . . . confuse the issue because
they look like eternal truths about the nature of corporations”).
84. The opposing view would be that the claim has no truth-value: one can
neither say that a corporation has the inherent ability to speak or that it does
not. This might be attributable to the fact that corporations can speak in some
contexts but not others. See supra Part II.B (discussing inconsistencies in
deducing inherent corporate characteristics).
85. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
86. Id. at 636 (emphasis added). The Court paraphrased the language of
Sir Edward Coke. See EDWARD COKE, 5 THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT.:
IN THIRTEEN PARTS pt. X, at *32b (photo. reprint 2002) (1826).
87. See, e.g., NMI Sys., Inc. v. Pillard, 179 B.R. 357, 371 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1995) (stating that corporations, through officers, can “‘sign instruments’”
(quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2010))).
88. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 66–67 (discussing how Santa Clara
was the first U.S. Supreme Court assertion that “a corporation was a person
under the Fourteenth Amendment” and how the Court failed to elaborate or
provide a rationale).
89. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010). The Court cited
twenty-one cases to support this contentious point. Id.
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likely attached in the predecessor cases that the Court relies
upon now for support.90 When courts do not cite to statute or
precedent, one would hope that the courts’ language and
reasoning indicate the source of the corporate right; a sheer lack
of elaboration can be “puzzling and controversial.”91 The
corporate right to constitutionally protected speech, traced back
through precedent, ultimately rests on the premise that
corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment92—a premise that is, itself, unexplained.93
Part of the reason for the U.S. Supreme Court’s silence might
be an uncertain balance between state and federal powers.
Generally, for matters dealing with the internal affairs of
corporations, the Court looks to the state of incorporation to
interpret the law.94 Ultimately, however, Congress retains power
over the entire corporate function via the Commerce Clause.95
This leaves the U.S. Supreme Court and state courts in a strange
90. See, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252, 263
(1986) (stating that a restriction on direct expenditure of corporate funds for
electioneering violated the corporation’s First Amendment rights); HORWITZ,
supra note 33, at 66–67 (discussing the impact of an 1886 U.S. Supreme Court
decision finding—without explanation—that “a corporation was a person under
the Fourteenth Amendment”) (citing Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co.,
118 U.S. 394 (1886)); Krannich, supra note 36, at 62 (“[T]he Court has granted
corporations constitutional rights without engaging in the preliminary inquiry
of whether a corporation is entitled to them under the Constitution.”).
91. HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 66.
92. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 & n.15 (1978)
(“Freedom of speech . . . always ha[s] been viewed as . . . safeguarded by the Due
Process Clause, and the Court has not identified a separate source for the right
when it has been asserted by corporations.” (citations omitted)).
93. See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 66–67 (discussing how the Court simply
stated, without explanation, that “a corporation was a person under the
Fourteenth Amendment”); see also HORWITZ, supra note 88 (providing the case
that asserts the corporate right without explanation).
94. See, e.g., Rogers v. Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933)
(“[A] court—state or federal—sitting in one State will . . . decline to interfere
with . . . the management of the internal affairs of a corporation organized
under the laws of another state but will leave controversies as to such matters
to the courts of the state of the domicile.”).
95. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to
regulate commerce); Norman R. Williams, Why Congress Cannot “Overrule” the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 153, 216 (2005) (discussing
Laurence Tribe’s position that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to set
rules for corporations).
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conundrum: because state courts do not answer questions of
federal constitutional law and the Supreme Court avoids
questions of corporate law, judicial interpretation of the corporate
entity remains a mystery.96 When the Court then issues decisions
asserting corporations’ personal rights without explanation, the
public, not surprisingly, views the decision with a degree of
cynicism, or at least skepticism.97
In state courts, of course, the Fourteenth Amendment is not
the source, but rather the vehicle, of corporations’ personal
rights.98 In fact, the amendment exacerbates the confusion by
virtue of its own far-reaching applications. Although corporations
are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment,99 the Court
cannot mean that they share the exact same set of Fourteenth
Amendment rights as individual persons. Even if corporations’
rights were a subset of persons’ rights, corporations could not
“vote on equal terms with natural persons,”100 much less attend
the same elementary school.101 Thus the question remains: What
subset of person-type rights do corporations possess?
If legislatures refuse to say that corporations are a subset of
persons or share the same set of rights as its members, and
likewise do not state that corporations’ only rights are those
96. This Note credits Professor Christopher Bruner with pointing out the
federalism problem here. Other authors have discussed, for example, “whether
the internal affairs doctrine is only a choice-of-law rule or whether it is also a
rule of constitutional law.” Jack B. Jacobs, The Reach of State Corporate Law
Beyond State Borders: Reflections Upon Federalism, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1149,
1164–67 (2009).
97. See, e.g., Jeff Clements, “We Never Said Corporations Are People; We
Said They Are Voices, Speakers, Speech-Makers, a Class of Persons. That’s
ARE
NOT
PEOPLE
(Jan.
23,
2012),
Different.”,
CORPORATIONS
http://corporationsarenotpeople.com/2012/01/23/we-never-said-corporations-arepeople-we-said-they-are-voices-speakers-speech-makers-a-class-of-persons-thatsdifferent/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (arguing against the Citizens United result)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
98. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664, 666 (1925)
(incorporating the First Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment).
99. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779–80 (1978)
(applying Fourteenth Amendment protections to corporations).
100. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate Over Fetal Homicide
Laws, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 755 n.170 (2006) (citation omitted).
101. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (desegregating
schools under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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explicitly provided by charter, then the courts cannot wholly
define a corporation by ascribing some of its rights in a few
different contexts.102 Finding a holistic framework for
determining, in theory, whether and when particular personal
rights ought to apply to corporations thus becomes an arduous
task—one the U.S. Supreme Court has not fully or consistently
undertaken.103 Citizens United embodies this struggle with
respect to corporate political speech.104
III. Citizens United
A. Background
Aside from legal limitations, corporations have the financial
ability to make large donations, in the form of direct
“contributions” to candidates or “independent expenditures”105
toward electioneering, using funds amassed from the efforts of
individual persons. Contributions are direct donations to
candidates and have historically been prohibited as a means for
corporations to spend funds on federal candidates.106 Independent
expenditures—the type of spending at issue in Citizens United—
are “money[s] spent for a communication that expressly
advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified Federal
candidate.”107 The first congressional prohibitions on corporate
102. See HART, supra note 60, at 41 (“It is easy to see that a statement about
the rights of a limited company is not equivalent to the statement that its
members have those same rights.”).
103. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 62 (observing that the Court has
frequently used the entity or aggregate theories as metaphors to interpret the
Constitution in the corporate context, but that the use has been ad hoc and
without regard to any simultaneous mutual exclusiveness among the theories).
104. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (stating
without explanation that the U.S. Supreme Court has treated corporations as
people under the First Amendment), with id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[T]he individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in
association with other individual persons.” (emphasis removed)).
105. 11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a) (2000) (defining independent expenditure as “an
expenditure by a person for a communication expressly advocating the election
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate . . . .”).
106. See id. at 887 (stating that the corporate contribution ban persists).
107. Federal Election Commission, Citizens’ Guide Brochure (Feb. 2004),
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/citizens_guide_brochure.pdf (last visited
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contributions and independent expenditures were the Tillman
Act of 1907108 and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
(the Taft–Hartley Act).109 The complete ban on corporate general
fund political spending endured until the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)110 provided an exception.111 FECA
allowed corporations to establish separate funds through socalled Political Action Committees (PACs) to solicit voluntary
donations that could be contributed to federal campaigns.112
In 1976, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo113 upheld limits on
individual direct contributions to candidates, even though they
suppressed political speech, because the government had a
prevailing interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption (or the
appearance
thereof)
by
candidates
accepting
large
114
contributions. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned individual
Feb. 24, 2012) (providing information for citizens to participate in the federal
election process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
108. See Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006)) (prohibiting corporate monetary
contributions to political campaigns).
109. See Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L.
No. 80-101, sec. 304, § 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 141 (2006)) (barring corporate independent expenditures to political
campaigns); Federal Election Commission, The Federal Election Campaign
Laws: A Short History, http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited Nov. 18,
2011) (outlining the history of campaign laws) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
110. Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 316, 90 Stat. 490
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006)) (placing legal limits on
corporate contributions to campaigns).
111. See A Guide to the Current Rules for Federal Elections, CAMPAIGN LEGAL
CENTER,
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=1187%3Aa-guide-to-the-current-rules-for-federal-elections&catid
(last visited Aug. 23, 2012) (explaining the law on corporate political
contributions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
112. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b) (2006) (providing for Political Action
Committees); E. Stewart Crosland, Note, Failed Rescue: Why Davis v. FEC
Signals the End to Effective Clean Elections, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265, 1270
(2009) (discussing PACs); Federal Election Commission, The Federal Election
Campaign Laws: A Short History, http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last
visited Nov. 18, 2011) (outlining the history of campaign laws) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
113. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckley, the Court held that
expenditure limits suppress constitutionally protected political speech. Id. at 54.
114. See id. at 29 (finding that the “weighty interests [that are] served by
restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are
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independent expenditure limits, however, because they were a
severe restriction on political-speech rights115 and did not “serve
any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or
appearance of corruption in the electoral process.”116 (This rule—
that the government may restrict individual contributions but not
individual independent expenditures—is essentially what
Citizens United later applied to corporations.)117 Two years after
Buckley, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,118 the Court
held that corporations may spend unlimited funds on issues and
initiative campaigns so that the public may hear the corporate
perspective.119
In 1990, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce120 stated
that a prohibition on a corporation’s use of treasury funds for
direct independent campaign expenditures amounted to
suppression of political speech.121 Yet the Court upheld a
sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms”). The
Court stated that restrictions on contributions are the “the Act’s primary
weapons against the reality or appearance of improper influence stemming from
the dependence of candidates on large campaign contributions.” Id. at 58.
115. See id. at 25 (“The expenditure limitations contained in the [Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971] represent substantial rather than merely
theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech.”).
116. Id. at 47–48.
117. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010) (striking down
the ban on corporate independent expenditures).
118. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In Bellotti, the
Court held that a Massachusetts statute prohibiting certain corporate political
expenditures violates the First Amendment. Id. at 776.
119. See id. at 784 (“[I]t amounts to an impermissible legislative prohibition
of speech based on the identity of the interests that spokesmen may represent in
public debate over controversial issues and a requirement that the speaker have
a sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication.”); see also
Nathaniel Persily, Contested Concepts in Campaign Finance, 6 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 118, 121 (2003) (discussing Bellotti’s holding).
120. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654–55 (1990)
(holding that a statute prohibiting corporations from using corporate treasury
funds for independent expenditures was constitutional because the provision
was narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental purpose). In Austin, the
Court found that preventing corruption (or the appearance of corruption) in the
political arena to be a compelling governmental interest because mass corporate
treasuries could unfairly influence election outcomes. See id. at 660 (“Corporate
wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of
independent expenditures . . . .”).
121. See id. at 657 (stating that requiring corporations to make political
contributions only through PACs “burdens corporate freedom of expression”
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restriction on corporate expenditures because it found a
compelling governmental interest in preventing the “distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form.”122 The Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (McCain–Feingold Act or BCRA)123 and
McConnell v. FEC124 reemphasized that PACs provide a sufficient
outlet for corporate speech and asserted the constitutionality of
prohibiting corporate independent expenditures not from these
designated funds.125 Specifically, BCRA amended 2 U.S.C. § 441b
to prohibit corporations from using general treasury funds to
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a political

(citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 252 (1986))). The
Citizens United Court deemed Austin a shift in corporate campaign contribution
jurisprudence. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (“The Court is thus
confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids
restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a
post-Austin line that permits them.”). But see Case Comment, Citizens United v.
FEC: Corporate Political Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 75, 75 (2010) (listing the
history from the Tillman Act of 1907 through Austin as consistently upholding
restrictions on corporate campaign spending).
122. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
123. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain–Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91–92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)
(2006)) (prohibiting corporations and unions from using funds to make
independent expenditures for electioneering communications or for speech
expressly targeting a political candidate).
124. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003) (concluding that § 441b
does not impermissibly ban speech “[b]ecause corporations can still fund
electioneering communications with PAC money”); see also Richard L. Hasen,
Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 989, 992 (2011) (discussing McConnell); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the
Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens
United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1063 (2011) (deferring to
Congress’s bright-line test for defining what constitutes an electioneering
communication).
125. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 104–05 (“Because those entities may still
organize and administer segregated funds, or PACs, for such communications,
the provision is a regulation of, not a ban on, expression.”); see also Case
Comment, supra note 121, at 76 n.11 (pointing out that the four Justices
concurred with the portion of the opinion regarding corporate expenditures).
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candidate.126 In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of this provision in Citizens United.127
B. The Opinion
Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation with funds primarily
donated by individuals, wanted to air a film that clearly
advocated the defeat of Senator Hillary Clinton in the Democratic
Party’s 2008 Presidential primary elections.128 This violated the
terms of the § 441b prohibition on corporate independent
expenditures.129
Justice Kennedy, writing for the five-Justice majority, placed
the weight of the decision on whether corporations have the same
rights as individuals with respect to political speech.130 Two
predecessor cases, taken together, suggested they do: Bellotti
upheld First Amendment protection of corporate speech rights131
and Buckley maintained that contribution limits curb political
speech.132 Members of the public have sometimes generalized this
as: corporations are people, and money is speech, so corporate
expenditures cannot be restricted.133

126. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
§ 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91–92 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)) (prohibiting
corporate electioneering independent expenditures).
127. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (explaining the
relevant statute and precedent).
128. See id. at 887 (stating the facts).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 903 (“The Court is thus confronted with conflicting lines of
precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on
the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.”).
131. See id. at 902 (applying Bellotti); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 784–85 (1978) (stating that corporations are entitled to protected
speech).
132. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (applying Buckley); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (stating that expenditure limits substantially
restrain political speech).
133. See, e.g., David Kairys, Money Isn’t Speech and Corporations Aren’t
People, SLATE (Jan. 22, 2010, 9:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/money_isnt_speech_and_corporations_arent_peop
le.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (arguing against Citizens United) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Justice Kennedy overruled Austin as inconsistent with “the
principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government
may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s
corporate identity.”134 To protect this speech, the Court applied
the most protective standard: “Laws that burden political speech
are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to
prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”135
A statute restricting political speech based on the
antidistortion rationale in Austin fails to meet this standard
because the government has no interest “‘in equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome
of elections.’”136 Rejecting the antidistortion rationale in Austin,
the Court stated that “[n]o sufficient governmental interest
justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit
corporations.”137 By finding the conflicting precedent in Austin to
be a speech restriction based on the speaker’s corporate identity,
contrary to the First Amendment, Justice Kennedy overruled the
case as poorly reasoned. The Court also overruled McConnell to
the extent that it upheld the statute restricting corporate
independent expenditures, finding the antidistortion interest
“unconvincing and insufficient.”138
After dismissing the antidistortion rationale as being
inconsistent with precedent and with the Constitution,139 the
Court rejected the Government’s other main justifications for the
§ 441b restrictions, that limits are necessary to prevent
corruption of political officials and that shareholders would be
compelled to fund corporate speech.140 The Court followed
Buckley,141 concluding that “[t]he anticorruption interest is not
134. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
135. Id. at 898 (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464
(2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. at 904 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48) (citation omitted).
137. Id. at 913.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 904–08 (providing reasoning to overrule Austin).
140. See id. at 908–11 (rendering the anticorruption and shareholderinterest rationales invalid).
141. See id. at 908 (stating that “‘the governmental interest in preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption [is] inadequate to justify [the ban]
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sufficient to displace the speech here in question” and that
“independent
expenditures,
including
those
made
by
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption.”142 The shareholder-interest rationale, the Court
stated, “would allow the Government to ban the political speech
even of media corporations” when the abuse could instead be
“corrected by shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate
democracy.’”143
In terms of novelty, therefore, Citizens United’s real
contribution was its rejection of the government’s policy
rationales for permitting a ban on corporate political speech,
rather than the already-established proposition that corporate
speech is protected to the same extent as individual speech.144
Regardless of the legal reality, however, the media and the public
have sometimes interpreted the case differently.
C. Public Impact
Citizens United has prompted a wide range of discussion
among the general public, primarily criticism.145 But the fear that
large public corporations would use amassed funds to make
sweeping expenditures has greatly subsided as the public has
realized how relatively little corporations have spent on
campaigns.146 Corporations’ hesitancy is most likely because
on independent expenditures’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976))).
142. Id. at 908–09.
143. Id. at 911 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
794 (1978)).
144. See Allison R. Hayward, Citizens United: Correct, Modest, and Overdue,
2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 1, 2–3 (2010) (discussing that Citizens United does
not overturn long-standing precedent).
145. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 2 & n.3 (listing responses); Robert
L. Kerr, Naturalizing the Artificial Citizen: Repeating Lochner’s Error in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 311, 311–
12 (2010) (listing a range of reactions to the case).
146. See Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the Political
Game?, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine
/how-much-has-citizens-united-changed-the-political-game.html?pagewanted=
all (last visited Aug. 23, 2012) (“[W]hile it is true that corporations can now give
money for specific purposes that were prohibited before, it seems they
aren’t . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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publicly traded companies have to answer to shareholders and
customers about any questionable use of funds.147 The election
statistics from the first presidential general election since
Citizens United support this result. For example, companies
“contributed roughly $75 million to super PACs in the 2012
election cycle,”148 compared with the approximately $661 million
super PACs raised overall in that cycle.149
Some fears about the influence of super PACs and Citizens
United, however, have materialized. For example, although super
PACs may only advocate for—not directly contribute to—political
candidates, those supporting presidential candidates in the 2012
general election collected and spent more funds than the
candidates themselves:150 Priorities USA Action spent $67.5
million supporting President Barack Obama and liberal agendas,
147. See id. (“[Public companies] know those contributions might become
public at some point, and no company that sells a product wants to risk [a
substantial negative consumer reaction].”); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Mystery
Firm is Election’s Top Corporate Donor at $5.3 Million, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Nov.
5, 2012), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/11/mystery-firm-is-elections-topcorpo.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (“‘Fortune 500 companies are the least
likely to be the ones who will be out in front giving publicly,’ said Rick Hasen, a
law professor at the University of California-Irvine. ‘They want to have
influence over elections and elected officials, but they don't want to alienate
customers.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
148. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Mystery Firm is Election’s Top Corporate
Donor at $5.3 Million, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.open
secrets.org/news/2012/11/mystery-firm-is-elections-top-corpo.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2012) (providing super PAC independent expenditure data) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
149. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PACs,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=
2012&chrt=V&type=S (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
150. See Peter Overby, As ‘Citizens United’ Turns 2, SuperPACs Draw
Protests, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/20/14550
0168/superpacs-celebrate-anniversary-of-citizens-united-case (last visited Nov.
7, 2012) (quoting lawyer Ken Gross as stating that super PACs “are
metastasizing” and are “almost bigger than the party committees”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Alan Greenblatt, Big Money: Stuffing the
Ballot Box?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 4, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/
05/29/153914560/big-money-and-the-ballot-box (last visited Nov. 7, 2012)
(quoting Republican consultant Ed Goeas as stating, “‘Money is now at the end
that's furthest away from the candidates and furthest away from the
parties. . . . The money is with these other groups that are having more impact
on the campaign than the campaign itself.’”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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and Restore Our Future spent $142.7 million supporting
Republican nominee Mitt Romney and conservative agendas.151
Possibly even more influential are the 501(c)(4) organizations,
such as Crossroads GPS, co-founded by Karl Rove,152 and
Americans for Prosperity, affiliated with the Koch brothers; these
organizations can fund advertisements without disclosing how
much they have spent until after the election and without ever
disclosing their donors.153
Although the laws regulating these groups’ expenditures and
disclosures are not the direct result of Citizens United,154 some
people view the case as converting the political race to a money
standoff and “unleash[ing] a torrent of poorly disclosed, if
disclosed at all, spending by the superwealthy”155 and “of money
from businesses and the multimillionaires who run them, and as
a result we are now seeing the corporate takeover of American
politics”156—however inaccurate that perspective may be.157 Still,

151. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Super
PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.
php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&type=S (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (providing super
PAC independent expenditure data) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
152. Crossroads GPS also owns a super PAC, American Crossroads, which
spent $104.7 million for conservative agendas during the 2012 election cycle. Id.
153. See S.V. Date, Hate the Latest Political Ads? Don’t Blame ‘Citizens
United,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 13, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsall
politics/2012/06/13/154943400/hate-the-latest-political-ads-dont-blame-citizensunited (last visited Aug. 23, 2012) (describing the impact of “social welfare
organizations”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
154. Id. (stating that “[social welfare groups’] secret spending . . . is not due
to the 2010 Citizens United decision”).
155. Frank James, Watchdogs Seek to Shed More Light on ‘Dark Money;’ It’s
Not Easy, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsall
politics/2012/08/02/157789593/watchdogs-seek-to-shed-more-light-on-darkmoney-its-not-easy (last visited Aug. 23, 2012) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
156. Bai, supra note 146.
157. A critic might argue the significance of the fact that President Obama
won the reelection with 30% of his contributions coming from “amounts less
than $200 per person” and despite a huge Republican super PAC influence. Ctr.
for Responsive Politics, 2012 Election Spending Will Reach $6 Billion, Center for
Responsive Politics Predicts, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.open
secrets.org/news/2012/10/2012-election-spending-will-reach-6.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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the 2012 election cycle saw more outside158 spending than every
other election cycle since 1990—combined;159 the $1,032,901,165total is almost 3.5 times the 2008 election cycle’s spending.160
When adding in official spending, the people of the United States
spent a total of approximately $6 billion on federal election
campaigns for 2012.161
Regardless of the actual factors driving the substantial
increase in expenditures for this presidential election, many
Americans are legitimately concerned that Citizens United
overturned precedent that restricted corporate political speech
rights, stating that such corporate speech is protected by the U.S.
Constitution.162 One extreme generalization takes the form: “the
Supreme Court held that corporations are ‘people,’” but they do
not deserve the same rights as human people.163 This argument
indicates a belief that the Court based its decision on an entity
theory.164 Some commentators, and perhaps even Justice
Stevens,165 might agree that the Court assumes corporations are
158. This statistic considers independent expenditures, electioneering
communications, and communication costs, and it excludes party committees.
Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle,
Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/out
sidespending/cycle_tots.php (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Election Spending Will Reach $6
Billion, Center for Responsive Politics Predicts, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 31,
2012),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/10/2012-election-spending-willreach-6.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (stating, one week before the election,
that spending already reached $5.8 billion) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
162. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912–13 (2010) (overruling
Austin because it “abandoned First Amendment principles” by restricting
corporate political speech).
163. See, e.g., Mario, Tomorrow: Occupy Wall Street West, MITCHELL KAPOR
FOUND. (Jan. 19, 2012), http://blog.mkf.org/2012/01/19/tomorrow-occupy-wallstreet-west/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) (posting a flyer amounting Citizens
United to this claim) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
164. See supra Part II.A (discussing entity theories).
165. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[Corporations’] ‘personhood’ often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are
not themselves members of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our
Constitution was established.”).
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entities—either real or artificial.166 In general, those viewing the
Court as adopting an entity theory are suspicious of this theory
(as they see the Court taking it);167 the critics see the Court’s
conclusion in Citizens United as having adopting an entity theory
without any reason for doing so.168 Some theorists have argued
that the opinion supports either an entity or an aggregate theory,
and they criticize the normative conclusions that they draw from
the theory’s application in Citizens United.169 Professor David
Millon, however, recognized the social cost of this seemingly
endless170 debate:
[E]fforts to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’ have not succeeded. Indeed,
such intellectual exercises may have stood in the way of
careful examination of the truly urgent questions raised by
corporate activity. Analysis of difficult questions of social
policy have probably been hindered by assumptions about the
distinctiveness of activity in the corporate form, whether the
corporation is thought to be an entity or instead is an
aggregation of people distinct from the rest of society.171

Citizens United supports Professor Millon’s point because of the
significant (and negative) public reaction.172 Perhaps the policy
questions should be at the forefront of individuals’ minds because
those are the real terms that affect corporate rights; even if the
166. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 41 (“The entire Citizens United
opinion, both the majority and the dissent, are thus reflective of the real entity
view. Corporations stand on their own, independent of both the state that
created them and the shareholders that own them.”).
167. Editorial, The Court and Citizens United II, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2012,
at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/the-supremecourt-and-citizens-united-take-2.html?scp=1&sq=citizens%20united&st=cse
(“It’s
hard to see how the court’s conservative majority could contend that these
expenditures pose no threat to American democracy.”).
168. See id. (arguing that the Court had no reason to rule broadly, had
mistaken assumptions, and wrongly dismissed the likelihood of corruption).
169. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 41 (arguing that the Court used a
real-entity theory); Padfield, supra note 8, at 225 (arguing that the Court used
an aggregate theory); Kerr, supra note 145, at 314 n.28 (asserting the artificialentity theory in a Citizens United analysis).
170. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 3 (“[T]hroughout all of [the changes in
the legal conception of the corporation], spanning two millennia, the same three
theories of the corporation can be discerned.”).
171. David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood, 2
STANFORD AGORA 39, 58 (2001).
172. See supra Part III.C (discussing Citizens United’s public impact).
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Supreme Court adopted an entity theory, no one ought to care
about the metaphor when policy implications are in dispute.173 In
fact, Citizens United may implicate some new policy
considerations, particularly in the campaign finance context.174
D. Legal Impact
Citizens United might constrain courts or affect the public in
unanticipated ways, which could bear on corporate rights. First,
the Court upheld constitutional protection of corporate speech to
the same extent that individual speech is protected under the
First Amendment.175 By proclaiming this right to be facially
constitutional instead of addressing the issue as-applied,176 the
Court has limited its discretion. For example, corporations
currently cannot contribute directly to candidates,177 but
individuals may currently contribute up to $2,500 per federal
candidate, per election cycle.178 Based on the reasoning in
173. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the difference between making
metaphysical versus function claims).
174. See infra Part V (discussing policy arguments).
175. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (upholding
constitutional protection for corporate speech). The speech right first attached to
corporations in a previous case. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 784–85 (1978) (stating that corporations are entitled to protected speech).
176. See id. at 894 (“[I]t is necessary . . . to consider the [statute’s] facial
validity.”).
177. See Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006)) (prohibiting corporate monetary
contributions to political campaigns); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58
(1976) (stating that individual contribution limits are constitutional because
they “serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the
electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of individual
citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion”).
178. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2006) (limiting individual
contributions), with 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b) (2012) (increasing by price index), and
Price Index Adjustments for Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling
Disclosure Threshold, 77 Fed. Reg. 9925-01 (Feb. 21, 2012) (setting the 2012election individual contribution limit at $2,500). To clarify the distinction
between corporate funds and PAC funds, a corporation’s PAC may contribute to
each candidate up to $5,000 of the funds that corporate members designate for
that PAC, see 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (limiting PAC contributions to federal
candidates and their committees); corporations, however, cannot contribute
corporate general treasury money, see Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34
Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006)) (prohibiting
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Citizens United that monetary restrictions burdening political
speech are subject to strict scrutiny,179 and based on the Court’s
rejection of the antidistortion rationale,180 the U.S. Supreme
Court might strike down the ban on corporations contributing
directly to candidates as impermissibly restricting political
speech.181 Though a decision extending the protection to corporate
contributions might affect legal discourse about public policy, this
seems to be the extent of such a ruling’s collateral impact on
corporate theory because further protecting the corporate right to
speech through political contributions would most likely rely on
the same reasoning as the Court used to permit corporate
independent expenditures. Thus, a possible future decision to
permit corporate contributions might necessarily follow from
Citizens United.182
Second, although the media has sometimes exaggerated or
misinterpreted Citizens United,183 some legal implications of the
corporate monetary contributions to political campaigns).
179. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (applying strict scrutiny to laws
burdening political speech).
180. See id. at 913 (finding the antidistortion interest “unconvincing and
insufficient”).
181. Interview with Jason Torchinsky, Partner, HoltzmanVogelJosefiak
PLLC, in Lexington, Va. (Feb. 29, 2012).
182. Id. But see, e.g., United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 616 (4th
Cir. 2012) (reversing a federal district court decision that applied Citizens
United to ban corporate contributions); Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life,
Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 880 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming a federal district
court decision upholding a state’s ban on direct corporate contributions to
candidates); Eugene Volokh, Constitutional to Ban Corporate Contributions to
Candidates (as Opposed to Independent Expenditures), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(May 16, 2011, 12:20 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/05/16/constitutional-to-bancorporate-contributions-to-candidates-as-opposed-to-independent-expenditures/
(last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (arguing it is constitutional to ban corporate
contributions to candidates) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
183. See, e.g., Supreme Court OKs Corporate Campaign Contributions, PBS
(Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june10/supreme
court_01-21.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter PBS.ORG] (headlining,
erroneously, that corporate contributions are constitutional, as opposed to
independent expenditures) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Stephen Colbert SuperPAC & Frank Lutz, Corporations Are People, COLBERT
NATION (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-reportvideos/400559/october-24-2011/colbert-super-pac—corporations-are-people—frankluntz (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (attempting to make the idea that corporations
are people appealing to the public) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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opinion might indeed have far-reaching effects on the public and
on campaign finance reform. Groups forming under § 527 of the
Internal Revenue Code, including PACs,184 may gather uncapped
corporate and individual donations and use the funds for
independent campaign expenditures.185 Since Citizens United,
courts have had no discretion to limit these groups.186 Citizens
United also laid the groundwork187 for a federal circuit court
decision two months later, SpeechNow.org v. FEC,188 which led to
the clear ability for individuals to form “super PACs” to make
only independent expenditures.189 Super PACs have proliferated
as a means to “raise unlimited sums of money from corporations,
unions, associations and individuals, then spend unlimited sums
to overtly advocate for or against political candidates.”190 Rather
than focusing on the potential for public corporations’
overwhelming influence in the political sphere, perhaps the
public ought to be more concerned with individual associations,
unions, closely held companies, and other coordinating campaign
spenders that can raise and spend unlimited funds.191
184. Bill de Blasio, Citizens United and the 2010 Midterm Elections, THE
PUB. ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF N.Y. 8 (Dec. 2010), http://advocate.nyc.gov/files/
12-06-10CitizensUnitedReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (explaining 527
groups after Citizens United) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
185. Id. at 3–5 (discussing the effect of Citizens United).
186. See id. at 4 (stating that the Court enables 527 organizations to solicit
unlimited donations).
187. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The
independence of independent expenditures was a central consideration in
[Citizens United]. By definition, independent expenditures are not made in
concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate [or
his committees or agents].” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
188. See id. at 698 (concluding that contribution limits cannot
constitutionally be applied to individuals pooling money only to make unlimited
independent expenditures).
189. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept.
13, 2012), http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?cycle=2012 (last
visited Feb. 29, 2012) (explaining super PACs) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
190. Id.
191. See Interview with Jason Torchinsky, Partner, HoltzmanVogelJosefiak
PLLC, in Lexington, Va. (Feb. 29, 2012) (suggesting that publicly held
corporations are not the primary concern after Citizens United and
SpeechNow.org). These groups “cannot coordinate with campaigns” and must
disclose all expenditures frequently, allowing competing groups to track their
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Third, Citizens United may have committed courts and
legislatures to a broader conception of constitutionally protected
speech than anticipated. For example, although the decision
upheld disclosure requirements on independent expenditures,192
social welfare organizations formed under § 501(c)(4) of the
Internal Revenue Code can still accept unlimited anonymous
donations and use the funds for electioneering expenditures,193
and since 2010, corporations have been able to donate their funds
to those organizations.194 By allowing unlimited independent
expenditures and not protecting against loopholes such as the use
of 501(c)(4) organizations, Citizens United opened the door for
unlimited undisclosed corporate expenditures,195 and the courts
will have no discretion within the Constitution to ban these
expenditures if they become substantial.196 In addition, Citizens
United seems to have little or no effect on restrictions on charity
lobbying efforts.197
Citizens United’s legal impact is thus significant in the
context of electioneering, and the developments in this area of

spending. Id.
192. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (finding
disclosure requirements constitutional).
193. 501(c)(4)s may remain tax-exempt if the communications are “issuebased,” but advertisements can still reflect particular candidates in a bad light.
See Peter Overby, A Fine Line: Distinguishing Issue Ads From Advocacy, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (June 19, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/06/19/155325685/a-fineline-distinguishing-issue-ads-from-advocacy (last visited Aug. 23, 2012)
(showing how an issue advertisement can walk the line of advocating the defeat
of a candidate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
194. See Blasio, supra note 184, at 4 (explaining 501(c)(4)s after Citizens
United).
195. See id. at 3 (“While the Court acknowledged the permissibility of
disclosure requirements for political spending, the decision enabled many
corporations to spend money on independent political broadcasts without
disclosing the donors that fund their activities.”).
196. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892 (“[T]he Court cannot resolve this
case on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech that is
central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”).
197. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights
in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 407, 426 (2011) (concluding
that “Citizens United strongly suggests that the existing limits on lobbying by
charities continue to be valid”).
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law are deeply interrelated with the policy arguments regarding
corporate rights.198
IV. Corporate Theory After Citizens United
As some legal scholars were ready to move on from the
question of corporate personhood,199 the question became vastly
more interesting to the public.200 Commentators have
interpreted Citizens United as adopting the aggregate theory,
the real-entity theory, the artificial-entity theory, or no theory of
corporate rights.201 Courts do not consistently adopt one of these
views over the others.202 Even various U.S. Supreme Court
Justices have adopted, explicitly or implicitly, each of these three
theories at some point—and in some cases, more than one theory
in the same opinion.203 Given the inconsistent and seemingly
incompatible application of theories propounded by legal scholars
and courts alike, the public’s misunderstanding of Citizens
198. See infra Part IV.D (concluding that the real source of the corporate
right in Citizens United is policy).
199. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 171, at 58 (arguing that we may be better
off with a more appropriately focused debate). But see, e.g., Padfield, supra note
8, at 223 & n.74 (noting Millon’s and Dewey’s respective arguments against the
corporate theory debate and concluding that the debate is relevant to the
question of the corporate role in society).
200. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Corporate Sponsorship Is Campaign Issue on
Which Both Parties Can Agree, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2010, at A15 (providing
poll results and statements of political figures who oppose unlimited corporate
campaign expenditure).
201. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 41 (arguing that the Court used a
real-entity theory); Kerr, supra note 145, at 314 n.28 (asserting the artificialentity theory in a Citizens United analysis); Millon, supra note 171, at 56–57
(discussing the modern relevance of entity or aggregate theories of corporate
personhood); Padfield, supra note 8, at 225 (arguing that the Court used an
aggregate theory). This Note does not discuss the many other theories that
answer questions other than those concerning the nature or existence of the
corporate form. See, e.g., Padfield, supra note 8, at 215 (discussing other
prominent corporate theories).
202. See supra Part II.C (discussing the various positions courts have taken
on the corporate form and corporate personhood).
203. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 62 (observing that the Court has
frequently used the entity or aggregate theories as metaphors to interpret the
Constitution in the corporate context, but that the use has been ad hoc and
without regard to any simultaneous mutual exclusiveness among the theories).
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United is not surprising. Moreover, the public is misguided about
the source of the corporate speech right because the public relies
on the media’s rendition of an already inadequate opinion.204
A. The Public’s Misuse of “Person”
Public attention to corporate rights, after Citizens United in
particular, amplifies a main problem with theories of corporate
personhood: the fallacy that metaphysical discussions about
corporations can imply functional, legal conclusions.205
The use of the phrase “corporations are people” to deduce
personal corporate rights is a misclassification.206 Consider
dividing descriptive language about corporations, taken in
context, into three distinct sets: (1) metaphysical language, such
as “corporations are entities” or “corporations have rights derived
from their constituents,” which describes an ontological
conception of what a corporation is;207 (2) functional language,
such as “corporations provide limited shareholder liability” or
“corporations are established by charter,” which describes what
corporations are in real, legal, or practical terms;208 and
(3) language that is neither metaphysical nor functional, such as
normative or qualitative language. Focusing on the first two of
these three sets, the phrase “corporate person” can have two
different meanings. Metaphysically, it refers to a corporate
ontology in the same way that corporate-essence theories attempt
to represent corporations by using one of two metaphors—either
as entities separate from their shareholders or as an aggregate of
204. See, e.g., PBS, supra note 183 (headlining an error that corporate
contributions are constitutional, as opposed to independent expenditures—to
which the anchors correctly refer).
205. See supra Part II.B (discussing the circularity problem with presuming
an inherent truth about some corporate essence and then defining the essence
by deriving traits from that essence).
206. See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal
Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 660 (1926) (distinguishing the metaphysical from
the pragmatic use of “person”).
207. See id. (providing “two radically different types of definitions,” one
being “a definite metaphysical conception regarding the nature of things”).
208. See id. at 660−61 (providing a second type of definition “which proceeds
in terms of consequences, . . . stated in terms of specific effects extrinsically
wrought in other things”).

THE REAL ERROR IN CITIZENS UNITED

2207

participants. Importantly, this language does not ascribe real
traits to corporations, but rather allows us to speak about what a
corporation should be, based on its ontology or essence.
Functionally, “corporate person” defines a set of human rights
that corporations are permitted to adopt if the issue arises, as if a
court were saying, “Treat the corporation like a human in this
context.”209 This language is used to establish that corporations
actually have explicit, real rights when legislatures, courts, or
charters assign such rights.
Sometimes people confuse these two types of language in
order to answer questions about what a corporation or corporate
person is. For example, consider the two main branches of the
corporate-rights dichotomy: artificial and natural. Both attempt
to define what rights a corporation has to function within the law.
But when the law does not state whether a corporation has a
particular right, it may be tempting to ask the question, “What
sort of thing is a corporation—one that ought to have this right,
or one that ought not?” This crosses over into the metaphysical
category because we are speaking about the essence of a
corporation as a metaphor for something we can otherwise only
explain to the extent the law provides details.
Using language from one category in an attempt to draw
conclusions in another would be a “category error,” as Gilbert
Ryle defined the term in his philosophy of the human mind.210 In
Ryle’s classic example of a category error, a foreigner visits a
university, tours all the buildings and fields, sees the students
and faculty, and then asks: “But where is the University?”211 Ryle
explains that the foreigner asking the question commits a
category error by inferring that the university exists as another
“member of the class of which [the colleges, libraries, playing
fields, etc.] are members.”212 Classifying the language in Ryle’s
example into the three categories listed above makes the precise
flaw obvious. The term “where” indicates that the speaker wishes
to know a physical (functional) location. If he instead asked the
209. See id. at 661–62 (stating that calling corporations “persons” is a verbal
matter and does not impute new behaviors).
210. See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (1949) (explaining his term
“category-mistake”).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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implicit question (“What is a university?”), the expected response
would remain in the metaphysical category and commit no
error.213
Before applying the category-error notion to the corporatetheory context, it might help to illustrate why committing a
category error is problematic. Consider a mythical figure such as
the stork that delivers babies. People construct this idea for when
children ask the inevitable conception question and for the
purpose of answering without being accountable for the
implications of the true answer, as a child would perceive it.
Parents can ascribe fictional traits to the stork: it can fly; it
carries the baby in swaddling clothes to the proper doorstep;
maybe even, it likes pickles. The stork continues to serve its real
purpose, and parents are satisfied.
But the stork is a fabrication by humans for a purpose.
Realities persist: just as limited shareholder liability does not
mean nobody pays a loss, babies are actually being conceived
regardless of children’s naivety. Talking about the stork in the
same construct as real beings or objects produces inconsistencies.
A husband who tells his wife, “Honey, ask the stork if he wants
more pickles,” will leave the wife bewildered; it puts the stork in
the “existing” category when it should be in the “non-existing”
category. Likewise, discourse about corporations on a
metaphysical level using functional language (where the legal
world seems to operate) commits a category error.214 The only
way we can consistently speak about what corporations ought to
be is on the metaphysical level, but we can speak about what
corporations can actually, legally do on the functional level.215
Once one spouse commits the error by talking about the stork
in functional and metaphysical terms simultaneously, the other
spouse rightly questions whether the stork is overstepping its
purpose; no partner wants to be replaced by a mythical stork.
Returning to the logical flaw in reasoning, the phrase “ask the
stork if he wants more pickles” presumes there exists a truth213. See id. (dissecting the university example).
214. See id. at 16 (explaining category mistakes).
215. See Dewey, supra note 206, at 660 (describing two different types of
definitions: metaphysical regarding the nature of things and pragmatic
regarding consequences).
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value about whether he does.216 But the answer to the question is
derived from the parents, not the stork; there is no answer until
the parents make it up. Likewise, after Citizens United, the
public’s fear that corporations are people in the metaphysical
sense, deriving rights from the person mold it attempts to fill,
illuminates the real problem at issue: the corporate right to free
speech via independent expenditures does not derive from
corporate personhood.217
When criticizing Citizens United, the public interprets the
Court as speaking about the essence of a corporation, which
belongs in the metaphysical category.218 In fact, Justice Kennedy
uses terms that describe corporate constituents or qualities in
themselves, which belong in the functional category.219 For a
simple example, “Citizens United wanted to make [the film]
available . . . . It feared, however, that both the film and the ads
would be [banned].”220 Most people would recognize that these
personal verbs are only being used in the functional sense; it is
hard to imagine this language as an indication that corporations
literally and naturally are capable of having desires or fears.
The problem with using theories to derive corporate traits
arises with the idea that corporations have an essence from
which we can deduce corporate rights.221 In 1926, John Dewey
distinguished the corporate body as a mere right-and-dutybearing unit from the corporate body as having a nature such
that rights can be ascribed to it.222 He rejects the notion that even
216. See supra Part II.B (discussing the circularity of deducing
characteristics that only exist if fabricated).
217. See supra Part II.B (concluding that deducing rights from corporate
personhood begs the question).
218. See, e.g., David Kairys, Money Isn’t Speech and Corporations Aren’t
People, SLATE (Jan. 22, 2010, 9:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/01/money_isnt_speech_and_corporations_arent_
people.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (arguing against Citizens United) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
219. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 888 (2010) (using
personal language).
220. Id. (emphasis added).
221. See Dewey, supra note 206, at 660 (arguing that ordinary connotations
of “person” do not apply in the sense of the corporate person as a unit bearing
rights and duties).
222. See id. at 658–59 (2010) (discussing whether we assume corporations
have a nature).
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“right-and-duty-bearing unit[s] should have a character of [their]
own”223 by asserting that implicit theories in the minds of jurists,
such as the aggregate and entity theories, do not vest in
jurisprudence without “confusion, conflict and uncertainty.”224
Dewey exposes the error of packing the term “person” with
extraneous uses of the word, such as psychological or
philosophical uses; “person” is meant for the limited use with
which courts or legislators explicitly dictate.225
Although the public might misunderstand Citizens United’s
use of person, the opinion’s use is precisely to give constitutional
protection to corporations to the same extent as it applies to
individuals.226 Indeed, if the courts and legislatures could
physically list every manifestation of personal speech rights and
then map that list onto corporations, the debate would not
concern corporate personhood but rather purely normative claims
about whether policy supports a corporation’s having those
rights. “Person” is a mere convenience to answer questions about
corporate rights and duties, and deducing corporate rights from
some corporate essence is a semantic error—a category error from
conflating the metaphysical with the functional.227
B. Looking for Theoretical Language in Citizens United
1. Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
avoids committing a category error because he does not deduce
the corporate right from the essence of a corporate person.
Instead, he begins with general language about a speaker’s rights
without establishing first whether a corporation qualifies as a
speaker: “the Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower
223. Id. at 660.
224. Id.
225. See id. at 655–56 (arguing that the term “person” in the legal sense is
affected by extraneous influences, such as what “person” signifies in popular
speech, psychology, philosophy, or morals).
226. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (“First
Amendment protection extends to corporations.”).
227. See HART, supra note 60, at 42–43 (explaining the circularity in
deducing corporate characteristics from a corporate form).
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ground without chilling political speech, speech that is central to
the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”228 Further,
“[t]he right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened
self-government and a necessary means to protect it.”229 Next,
Justice Kennedy finds corporations’ right of free speech: “The
Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to
corporations.”230 He cites this sentence to twenty-one cases that
support similar claims based on a chain of precedent tracing back
to the single 1886 case, which declares the corporate right
without justification.231 Justice Kennedy follows suit by providing
only this one sentence to explain the extension of that right to
corporations.232 From that right, Justice Kennedy immediately
extends the protection to political speech, and then to the primary
issue of independent expenditures, never returning to the
application of personal rights to corporations.233
In the following sections of the opinion, Justice Kennedy
addresses and rejects the arguments that the government has
sufficient interest in preventing corruption (or its appearance),234
in preventing a distortion based on the speaker’s wealth,235 and in
protecting shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate
speech, concluding that none of those arguments adequately
protect a valid constitutional right of speech.236 He specifically
applies each of these conclusions to corporations, stating that
Buckley and Bellotti “could not have been clearer” that “the
Government cannot restrict political speech based on the
speaker’s corporate identity”237 and rejecting the “post-Austin line
228. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892.
229. Id. at 898.
230. Id. at 899.
231. See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 66–67 (discussing how Santa Clara was
the first U.S. Supreme Court assertion that “a corporation was a person under
the Fourteenth Amendment” and how the Court failed to elaborate or provide a
rationale).
232. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–90 (2010).
233. Id. at 900–01.
234. Id. at 908.
235. Id. at 904.
236. Id. at 911.
237. Id. at 902.

2212

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2171 (2012)

[of cases] that permits [corporate-based restrictions].”238 Indeed,
in Bellotti, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the need to stick
to constitutional interpretation, as opposed to corporate theory:
“The proper question therefore is not whether corporations ‘have’
First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive
with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be
whether [the statute] abridges expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect.”239
Justice Kennedy could only be construed to make statements
about the corporate essence or corporate rights in two places:
First, he states that “[c]orporations, like individuals, do not have
monolithic views. On certain topics corporations may possess
valuable expertise . . . .”240 This commits no category error; while
the former sentence seems to be metaphysical, it does not infer
any legal conclusions based on that claim. The latter sentence
does not definitively assert any right or trait. Second, Justice
Kennedy states: “[W]ealthy individuals and unincorporated
associations can spend unlimited amounts on independent
expenditures. Yet certain disfavored associations of citizens—
those that have taken on the corporate form—are penalized for
engaging in the same political speech.”241 In context, Justice
Kennedy is making the point that wealthy individuals are
sometimes as influential as corporations and that corporations
should be treated as other associations of citizens. This too seems
purely functional because Justice Kennedy already asserted that
corporations are treated as persons for speech rights, so this only
asserts rights already derived from legal precedent—it does not
imagine new rights that ought to attach to the corporate citizen
due to its form or essence. Therefore, Justice Kennedy’s language
appears clear of subscription to any theory for purposes of
improperly deriving corporate rights.
Some commentators, however, interpret Justice Kennedy’s
language as suggesting the aggregate theory, referring to the
majority’s statements about banning “‘the political speech of

238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 903.
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912 (2010).
Id. at 908 (citation omitted).
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millions of associations of citizens’”242 and penalizing “‘certain
disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on the
corporate form.’”243 One scholar asserts, “[t]he majority viewed
the corporation as fundamentally little more than an association
of citizens.”244 Some of the Court’s claims, however, are trivially
true by virtue of the corporate function in society, such as saying
a corporation is an association of individuals.245 This does not
reflect any metaphysical claim about the essence of a corporation
from which we can deduce rights.246 To read the opinion as
asserting that the corporation is an aggregate retaining the
rights of its constituents is problematic: on one hand, if it inherits
all of its constituents’ rights, contradictions will arise for those
rights a corporation has been said not to possess, such as the
right to swear an oath; on the other hand, if the aggregate only
gleans some of the personhood rights, the court will still have to
determine which rights it retains, which begs the question—it
retains precisely those rights that the Court stipulates.247 The
only sense in which the opinion could properly be advocating the
aggregate theory, then, is in the metaphorical sense, merely to
discuss the corporation, not to deduce functional rights.
Professor Avi-Yonah argues that the majority’s language can
only indicate a real-entity view.248 He arrives at this conclusion
by process of elimination among the aggregate and entity
theories, and he uses Justice Kennedy’s statement that “the ban
on corporate speech was not alleviated by the fact that a PAC
organized and controlled by the same corporation could speak
freely because ‘[a] PAC is a separate association from the
242. Padfield, supra note 8, at 224 n.82 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
at 906–07).
243. Id. (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908).
244. Id. at 224.
245. For example, if several individuals incorporate their business and hang
a sign, it would seem to be speech of a corporation—an association of
individuals—under any theory.
246. See HART, supra note 60, at 42–43 (“Under what conditions do we refer
to numbers and sequences of men as aggregates of individuals and under what
conditions do we adopt instead unifying phrases extended by analogy from
individuals?” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
247. See id. (explaining the circularity in deducing corporate characteristics
from a corporate form).
248. Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 39.
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corporation.’”249 First, Professor Avi-Yonah asserts that Justice
Kennedy does not advocate the aggregate theory because “under
the aggregate view both the corporation and the PAC are owned
by the same ultimate shareholders,” so they could not both be
equivalent with their parts if they are “‘separate
association[s].’”250 Second, Professor Avi-Yonah tackles the
artificial–real entity distinction (the corporate-rights dichotomy)
to narrow down his interpretation that Justice Kennedy takes an
entity position.251 He rejects that Justice Kennedy assumes an
artificial-entity view, which posits that the corporation is an
entity with rights to the extent the state grants them.252 This
theory, Professor Avi-Yonah claims, is inconsistent with Justice
Kennedy’s statement about a PAC being separate from the
corporation because “both the PAC and the corporation are
created by the same state” and controlled by the same
corporation, so would presumably be the same association of
people.253
Professor Avi-Yonah presumes he is left with only the realentity theory, which states that corporations are entities consisting
of shareholders with separate management and corporate rights
beyond what the legislature prescribes.254 He mentions John
Dewey’s argument that the aggregate and entity theories are
circular and “could be deployed to suit any purpose.” Professor AviYonah then briefly considers how Dewey’s argument “dismisses as
irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial entity, and
real entity views of the corporation.”255 He acknowledges the
credibility of this view but then promptly moves on, stating that,
“As a practical matter, . . . the real entity view predominated for
249. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct.
876, 897 (2010)).
250. Id. (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897).
251. See id. at 33 (defining the real- and artificial-entity theories and the
aggregate theory).
252. Id. (stating that the artificial entity theory “views the corporation as a
creature of the State”)
253. See id. at 39 (discussing how the majority adopts the real entity view
because it implicitly rejects the aggregate view and “does not even mention the
artificial entity view”).
254. See id. at 33 (defining the real- and artificial-entity theories and the
aggregate theory).
255. Id. at 23 (citing Dewey, supra note 206, at 673).
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large, publicly traded corporations.”256 Rather than rejecting
Dewey’s view, therefore, he merely observes that its popularity
faded.257 In sum, Professor Avi-Yonah rejects that Justice Kennedy
aligns with the aggregate or artificial-entity theories but provides
no direct language in support of his claim that Justice Kennedy
espouses a real-entity theory.258 This lack of affirmative foundation
for the real-entity theory in Citizens United does not pair well with
Professor Avi-Yonah’s willingness to overlook Dewey’s argument
that none of the three theories are on point. To agree with
Professor Avi-Yonah, either we are left to our own devices to reject
Dewey’s argument or we must defer to general legal scholars’
silence in reaction to Dewey’s theory, which seems to have left
them scratching their heads until enough time passed to sweep his
point under the rug as too devastating to centuries of corporatelaw theories.259
In fact, Dewey’s point is not so devastating. Professor AviYonah seems to recognize that his argument may have contributed
to a more practical (functional) use of the theories, rather than
theoretical (metaphorical).260 Still, as long as scholars attempt to
use metaphor-based theories (such as the corporate-essence
theories) to answer questions about corporations’ functional, real
rights, Dewey’s point remains cogent: “‘person’ signifies what law
makes it signify.”261 A court stating that “corporations are people”
under one law only means to qualify people to include
corporations—it does not add a trait to the corporate form labeling
it as a person.
In other cases, the Court has not been so careful,262 and the
members of the public frequently commit this error.263 Justice
256. Id.
257. See id. (“Dewey was influential in that the theoretical debate on
corporate personality largely disappeared until the 1970s.”).
258. See id. at 39–43 (applying Citizens United language to align the justices
with corporate-rights theories).
259. See id. at 23 (glossing over the failure of Dewey’s theory to catch on).
260. See id. (“Dewey was influential in that the theoretical debate on
corporate personality largely disappeared until the 1970s. As a practical matter,
however, the real entity view predominated for large, publicly traded
corporations.”).
261. Dewey, supra note 206, at 655.
262. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“A corporation is, after
all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and with a
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Kennedy, it seems, either has inadvertently avoided a category
error by limiting his justification of the corporate person to
essentially one sentence (“The Court has recognized that First
Amendment protection extends to corporations.”)264 or, more likely,
has properly stayed within the narrow lines of federal jurisdiction
by carefully choosing his language to avoid expanding the
corporate essence based on a mere image of what a corporation
ought to be.265 Despite his tiptoeing around corporate law,
however, he is not off the hook for the confusion surrounding
Citizens United.266
2. Justice Scalia’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia offers more debatable language in his
concurring opinion. He finds the majority opinion consistent with
the Framers’ intent to constitutionalize free speech for individual
Americans:
All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of
individual men and women—not, for example, of trees or polar
bears. But the individual person’s right to speak includes the
right to speak in association with other individual persons . . . .
It is the speech of many individual Americans, who have
associated in a common cause, giving the leadership of the
[group] the right to speak on their behalf . . . . [A corporation]
cannot be denied the right to speak on the simplistic ground
that it is not “an individual American.”267

To some this may seem like language characteristic of the
aggregate view,268 but Professor Avi-Yonah correctly presumes
distinct legal entity.”).
263. See supra Part II.B (discussing the circularity problem with presuming
an inherent truth about some corporate essence and then defining the essence
by deriving traits from that essence).
264. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
265. See id. at 886–917 (defending the decision on grounds of constitutional
analysis, stare decisis, and policy).
266. See infra Part V.A (criticizing the opinion for its lack of a clear
rationale).
267. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 43–44 (describing the aggregate
theory as viewing the corporate essence based on an aggregation of its
shareholders and other participants).

THE REAL ERROR IN CITIZENS UNITED

2217

that Justice Scalia means “corporate management working
together as an association of persons” for a common cause.269 In
fact, Justice Scalia’s language, such as referring to the
corporation as a “legal entity,”270 is consistent with Professor AviYonah’s interpretation that Justice Scalia might adopt a realentity theory,271 which would be proper so long as Justice Scalia
does not transgress into metaphysical notions about corporate
nature.
Most telling, however, of Justice Scalia’s use of the entity
conception of a corporation is his apparent assumption that the
First Amendment applies to corporations insofar as it does not
exclude them outright.272 Because Justice Scalia essentially
presumes corporations have the same First Amendment speech
rights that people have, he provides no justification for this
premise and we are left to wonder if he grounded it in a right
derived from the corporate essence or in actual law. If the right
comes from his notion of the corporate entity, this is an
impermissible category error: obviously an association of people
cannot have all of the same rights as the individuals that make it
up, such as the right to vote in an election, but the question
“Which rights does it derive from its individuals?” cannot be
answered with “The same rights that its individuals are entitled
to.” Conversely, if Justice Scalia implicitly justified the right
using law, he would have had to rely on precedent that interprets
the First Amendment to apply to corporations. This presents its
own problems, as Part II.C explains: all of the precedent
supporting corporate personal constitutional rights traces back to
269. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 40 (arguing that Scalia might
appear to adopt the aggregate view, but “what Scalia meant was presumably
corporate management working together as an association of persons”).
270. Justice Scalia actually uses the term “artificial legal entity,” but his use
of the adjective artificial must not be confused with the term used in this Note,
which refers to the corporation as a mere creature of the law, whose only rights
are those conferred by the state. See supra note 38 and accompanying text
(defining the artificial-entity theory). Justice Scalia seems to use artificial to
mean that the legal entity is not a tangible, visible thing but merely one
constructed for thinking about the concept of a corporation.
271. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 39–40 (arguing that Justice Scalia
adopts the real-entity view).
272. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 926 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (finding no support for “the proposition that the First Amendment
excludes conduct of artificial legal entities from the scope of its protection”).
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one sentence in one 1886 case, which simply declares the right
without any discussion.273
3. Justice Stevens’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens provides ample language analyzing corporate
nature. For example, he argues that “speech can be regulated
differentially on account of the speaker’s identity”274 and that this
applies especially to corporations because they raise special
concerns, such as the potential for corruptive influence.275 By
concluding this criticism with a list of other avenues for
expressing corporate speech, Justice Stevens seems to adopt an
entity viewpoint and assume rights based on that notion.276 He
presumes that the corporations are just a “different class[] of
speakers,”277 who are “not natural persons, much less members of
our political community.”278 Justice Stevens also asserts that the
Framers “held very different views about the nature of the First
Amendment right and the role of corporations in society”279—that
“it was the free speech of individual Americans that they had in
mind”280 and that “‘[a] corporation [was thought of as] an artificial
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
the law[,] . . . possess[ing] only those properties which the charter
of its creation confers upon it.’”281 In particular, he asserts that:

273. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (tracing the precedent
back to an unsubstantiated opinion declaring that corporations are people
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
274. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 945 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
275. See id. at 947 (“[L]egislatures are entitled to decide that the special
characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation
in an electoral context.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
276. See id. at 943 (“The laws upheld in Austin and McConnell leave open
many additional avenues for corporations’ political speech.”).
277. Id. at 946.
278. Id. at 947.
279. Id. at 949.
280. Id. at 950.
281. Id. (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
518, 636 (1819)) (providing, within a citation, language of an 1819 case to
represent views of the Framers).
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[W]hereas we have no evidence to support the notion that the
Framers would have wanted corporations to have the same
rights as natural persons in the electoral context, we have
ample evidence to suggest that they would have been appalled
by the evidence of corruption that Congress unearthed in
developing BCRA and that the Court today discounts to
irrelevance.282

Justice Stevens explains that “corporations are different from
human beings” for many reasons, including their properties of
limited liability for owners and management, perpetual life,
separation of ownership and control, potential for foreign control,
an available treasury that reflects economically motivated
decisions of investors and customers, and a lack of beliefs,
feelings, thoughts, and desires.283 “[T]heir ‘personhood’ often
serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves
members of ‘We the People’ by whom and for whom our
Constitution was established.”284 He continues to evaluate “‘who’
is even speaking when a business corporation places an
advertisement,”—not the customers, employees, or shareholders,
leaving possibly a few managers who must sometimes overlook
even their own personal convictions regarding the message.285
When a four-Justice dissent continuously criticizes “[t]he
majority’s unwillingness to distinguish between corporations and
humans,”286 the public seems more justified in believing that
Citizens United stands for the claim that corporations are people.
In addition to explicit language, Justice Stevens introduces
arguments that rely on an understanding of the majority as
adopting an entity viewpoint. For example, he criticizes that the
majority considers the statute a categorical ban on speech, when
actually “every shareholder of every corporation remains entirely
free . . . to do however much electioneering she pleases outside of
the corporate form.”287 This criticism indicates that Justice
Stevens views the majority opinion as adopting an entity theory
and discerning rights from that notion, but he stops short of
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 963.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 972.
Id.
Id. at 975.
Id. at 943.
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identifying the problem with deducing rights from this
metaphorical corporate entity. Justice Stevens argues that the
majority “beg[s] the question what types of corporate spending
are constitutionally protected and to what extent.”288 Although
Justice Stevens criticizes this as circular,289 the inference (and
thus the circularity) cuts the other way: the Court is charged with
saying what types of corporate spending are constitutional when
a statute poses the question.290
In sum, no Citizens United Justices attempt to deny that
corporations have some personal constitutional rights under the
First Amendment. Justices Kennedy (for the majority), Scalia
(concurring), and Stevens (for the dissent) each provide
justification for the corporate right to political speech in one of
two ways: they either improperly derive the right from a mirage
of what they believe a corporation is or ought to be, or else they
base the right on unexplained precedent. Which of the two
justifications each Justice chooses is unclear.
C. What Citizens United Makes Clear
The U.S. Supreme Court has not been careful to provide the
public with a consistent image of the corporate form.291 In fact,
the Court’s previous manifestations of the error, sometimes
deriving functional rights from metaphysical notions about
inherent corporate form, have tainted the public’s impression of
the source of corporate rights.292 Therefore, the reaction to
Citizens United makes clear that, due to the Court’s cursory
288. Id. at 934.
289. Id. at 930 (“The conceit that corporations must be treated identically to
natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate
to justify the Court’s disposition of this case.”).
290. See Bruner, supra note 7, at 1388 (explaining, under Hart’s position,
that “we make the rules, and it is only by reference to those rules that the
corporation can be said to ‘be’ anything at all” (citations omitted)).
291. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 62 (observing that the Court has
frequently used the entity or aggregate theories as metaphors to interpret the
Constitution in the corporate context, but that the use has been ad hoc and
without regard to any simultaneous mutual exclusiveness among the theories).
292. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (using the aggregate
view to justify personal due process protection).
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analysis, the public has a misguided notion of the source of the
political speech right.
The inference the public often draws has two interrelated
flaws, the first logical and the second semantic. First, the
reasoning is backwards: the public interprets Citizens United as
using the premise “corporations are people” to deduce traits, but
that should be the conclusion—and only in the particular
instances when the law treats corporations as persons. Hart
identified this error in his claim that defining a corporation by
inherent rights is circular.293 The corporation only has
characteristics to the extent that courts and legislatures stipulate
them.294 The public would be marginally better off by saying,
“Corporations have the same speech rights as people, so
corporations are people,” but the overly broad conclusion does not
follow.295 In a constitutional analysis of personal rights, then, the
only proper way to claim that “corporations are people” is in
response to the question “What is the extent of corporate rights
pursuant to this particular constitutional provision?” Saying
“corporations are people” merely means corporations have the
same set of rights as people under the law in question; it is a
language tool to understand what law applies. Theorists and even
courts join the general public in often overlooking Hart’s point
when speaking about corporate personhood,296 but his point
follows clearly from the fact that corporations exist by virtue of
statutory law, judicial interpretation, and human participation.
The Citizens United Justices fail to eradicate this misconception,
and they possibly even commit the mistake themselves by
assuming what they seek to prove: that corporations are entitled
to First Amendment protection to the same extent as
individuals.297
293. See HART, supra note 60, at 42–43 (explaining the circularity in
deducing corporate characteristics from a corporate form).
294. See id. (explaining that corporations only have traits explicitly granted
by law).
295. Similarly, Hart uses the example of a trick in a card game to show how
attempting to define it in one context leads to inconsistencies when that
definition is “substituted for [the word trick] whenever it is used.” Id. at 33.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
296. See supra Part II.B (discussing the circularity of using theories to
deduce functional rights).
297. See supra Part IV.B (providing theoretical hints from each Justice’s
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Second, the inference commits a category error by using
functional language about a particular corporate right to infer a
metaphysical claim about the essence of corporations.298 John
Dewey explained that person is merely a term used for
convenience to say that, with respect to this particular issue, all
the rights of a person apply.299 Dewey would argue that person is
merely meant for the functional sense, and using it in the
metaphysical sense would be improper and would pack it full of
the real implications that come along with the word.300 The
particular category error evident in the public’s response to
Citizens United makes the same move by using functional
language to draw a metaphysical conclusion about corporations.
Again, the Citizens United Justices—more likely in the
concurring and dissenting opinions—possibly commit this error
themselves by failing to justify the corporate right to speech in
functional terms and, instead, deducing certain rights from a
vague conception of corporations.301
Each flaw—the logical and the semantic—produces the same
consequence: corporate personhood cannot be the source of
corporate rights and duties.
D. The Real Source of the Corporate Right in Citizens United
Part of the reason the public misunderstands Citizens United
as deriving the corporate speech right from corporate personhood
is that the opinion itself does not adequately explain how
corporations are endowed with the right. Whereas the public
itself typically has brought about many corporate rights by virtue
of its influence in legislatures, the Supreme Court confuses the
public by establishing a corporate right without explaining the
source. Further, the public needs to know the source in order to
scrutinize the Court; after all, Citizens United overturned a
language).
298. See RYLE, supra note 210, at 16 (explaining category mistakes).
299. See Dewey, supra note 206, at 655 (arguing that “person” signifies only
what the law makes it signify).
300. See id. at 660 (differentiating the two uses).
301. See supra Part IV.B (providing theoretical hints from each Justice’s
language).
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statute on constitutional grounds, rendering the decision largely
immune from future legislative, and thus public, interference. If
the corporate personal speech right did not arise from the
corporate essence, what is the source?
Obvious sources include statutes or public policy.302 Or
perhaps courts in the past have merely fabricated the right and
now courts blindly perpetuate it.303 The question is, at the
moment a right attaches, what is its justification? This question
avoids a category error because it is functional, not metaphysical:
the justification (if one exists) must be specific and with a legal or
social purpose—not abstract or with merely a theoretical purpose.
Recall the example of the stork:304 The stork is just a metaphor to
ease discussion; it cannot actually fly because it does not exist.
The parents can argue about whether the stork should
theoretically be able to fly, but they know it is their discretion—
they do not begrudgingly accept some truth that all imaginary
storks must fly. In contrast, the reality is that babies are
conceived and born; the physical world restricts what they can do,
and parents try to keep them in line.
Hiding behind a metaphor allows us to imagine that
corporations are exactly what we want them to be in any given
circumstance, regardless of contradictions this might pose in
reality. We created corporations to be just like people in some
ways, but not like people in other ways—often aiming to obtain
the best of both worlds, but we forget the inconsistencies a
piecemeal nature inevitably brings.305 When it comes to
addressing these inconsistencies or questions about corporate
rights, only two boundaries apply: corporations’ physical potential
to do certain humanlike activities and the rules that we set.
At issue in Citizens United is whether corporations should be
permitted to speak, in the form of political independent
302. See, e.g., FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011) (refusing to
find a corporate right of personal privacy when the statute says “person” instead
of “personal”).
303. See Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385, 402–03 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1883) (stating, without support, that a corporate personal right exists).
304. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the “stork” example).
305. For example, with limited liability, we stand to earn huge rewards if
the business prevails, but the potential for devastating loss is limited to our
investment; if that is exhausted, other members of society foot the bill.
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expenditures, to the extent that persons are permitted to do so.
While the public sees this decision as the Court bestowing a
major liberty on corporations, they do not see why or how; the
Court is virtually silent. The Court’s task is to justify the decision
and explain—even to the public—why it opines as it does.306 This
is the most important sense in which the Court errs in Citizens
United—not by its improperly deducing the right from a
metaphysical corporate essence but in failing to explain the
actual source of the right. The public is left to analyze the
decision.
Looking at the moment the Court attaches the personal right
of speech to corporations, what must the source be? First, the
Court infers the corporate speech right by stating that “First
Amendment protection extends to corporations” and citing plenty
of cases.307 Next the Court considers public policy arguments,
such as whether the corporate influence in the political sphere
might corrupt officials or distort the picture of public opinion.308
Looking to its predecessor cases, too, indicates public policy
justifications.309 As it appears from the decision, which lacks any
explanation for why this personal right extends to corporations,
Citizens United seems to ground the right in public policy. This
presents an irony: the public frames its dissatisfaction around the
corporate-rights debate, but as Professor Millon warned, the
unnecessary discourse of the corporate-rights debate pushes
important policy considerations aside.310 What makes Citizens
United important is that the source of the right actually is the
party who is most confused about the source of the right—the
public. Because the public’s traditional avenue to implement
preferred policy into law (through the legislatures) has been
removed by this Constitution-based decision, criticizing the Court

306. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions As Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455,
1463 (1995) (discussing the idea that the Supreme Court ought to explain its
conclusions to the public).
307. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899–900 (2010).
308. See, e.g., id. at 904–05 (considering the antidistortion rationale).
309. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 33–41 (looking at cases preceding
Citizens United).
310. See Millon, supra note 171, at 58 (stating that theoretical discussions
may detract from the focus on important policy considerations).
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for finding a corporate personal right is not the most useful
discourse.
V. Proper Grounds for Criticizing Citizens United
Per the foregoing discussion, one could criticize the opinion
by saying that the U.S. Supreme Court Justices rely on
metaphysical language to make a functional claim.311 The
majority opinion in Citizens United, however, seems to cleanly
remain in the functional category, and even the concurring
opinions make no substantial logical or semantic errors.312 If the
public views the opinion as not deducing rights from a corporate
essence, as this Note suggests it should, our society might still
benefit from a critical look at the opinion.
A. Attacking the Court’s View of Policy
One proper form of criticism would be that the Court
inadequately defended the policy rationale. The public’s negative
reaction to the opinion indicates that the Court, in relying on
public policy as the source of the corporate right, might have
ruled improperly by finding no sufficient government interest in
policy concerns.313 Apparently from the language of the majority
and concurring opinions and from the public’s reaction, the only
policy issues with any steam are the antidistortion rationale and
the anticorruption rationale.314
311. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority uses a theory as a basis for the right, and
that the theory is improper).
312. See supra Part IV.A (looking at the Justices’ language).
313. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices, 5–4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/
22scotus.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) (quoting President
Obama as denoting Citizens United “a major victory for big oil, Wall Street
banks, health insurance companies and the other powerful interests that
marshal their power every day in Washington to drown out the voices of
everyday Americans”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
314. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (dismissing the shareholder
interest and foreign national arguments with little discussion and on several
grounds).
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With respect to the antidistortion rationale, the decision did
not turn on whether there was a real risk of “an unfair advantage
in the political marketplace by using resources amassed in the
economic marketplace,”315 but rather on whether the government
had a compelling interest in this protection.316 The grounds for
reviving this issue would be the Court’s lack of due consideration
for the effect of distortion. The Court relies only on Buckley to
support a rigid claim that the government never has an interest
in this regard.317 But if corporate law has its basis in utilitarian
concerns,318 the public’s overwhelming dissatisfaction might be a
sign that the government does have an interest in permitting
checks on corporate power,319 even if it means overturning
precedent or allowing restrictions on political speech.320
In considering the anticorruption rationale, the Court has
rejected that corporate independent expenditures give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption.321 In early 2012, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in a one-paragraph per curiam decision,322
reversed a Montana Supreme Court ruling that upheld a statute
restricting corporate political expenditures despite Citizens
United and despite the fact that it restricted corporate speech.323
315. Id. at 904 (citation omitted).
316. See id. (“Buckley rejected the premise that the Government has an
interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence
the outcome of elections.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
317. Id. at 904–05 (stating that the government does not have an interest in
equalizing abilities to influence elections and that wealth is not sufficient to
limit political speech).
318. See Bruner, supra note 7, at 1387 (stating that utilitarianism is
“corporate law’s implicit moral theory”).
319. See generally Hasen, supra note 124 (discussing how the antidistortion
rationale was improperly orphaned).
320. See, e.g., Editorial, Montana Takes on Citizens United, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/opinion/montanas-challenge-tocitizens-united.html?_r=1 (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (discussing the aims of a
case that petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to revisit Citizens United) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
321. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010) (finding the
anticorruption interest insufficient to merit the restrictions on speech).
322. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012)
(stating that the “holding of Citizens United applies to the Montana state law”).
323. See id. (reversing the judgment that upheld a law contrary to the
Citizens United holding).
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The Montana court found a compelling state interest in
“preserving the integrity of its electoral process.”324 The U.S.
Supreme Court initially stayed the decision pending a timely
filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari.325 In
an order written February 17, 2012, Justice Ginsburg stated:
Montana’s experience, and experience elsewhere since this
Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Comm’n, make it exceedingly difficult to maintain that
independent expenditures by corporations “do not give rise
to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” A petition for
certiorari will give the Court an opportunity to consider
whether, in light of the huge sums currently deployed to
buy candidates’ allegiance, Citizens United should continue
to hold sway. Because lower courts are bound to follow this
Court’s decisions until they are withdrawn or modified,
however, I vote to grant the stay.326

An anticorruption argument would need to refute the Citizens
United finding that “independent expenditures, including those
made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption.”327 Then, the government would have
to prove its interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or
the appearance of it, but this may be a slighter burden than for
the antidistortion rationale.328 Indeed, the Court draws the
measure of interest from Buckley, which upheld limits on
direct contributions on anticorruption grounds.329
The Montana Supreme Court proceeded on other grounds,
holding that a statute regulating independent corporate
expenditures did not violate the corporation’s speech rights and,
324. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 2011 MT 328, ¶ 38, 363
Mont. 220, 236, 271 P.3d 1, 11 (2011).
325. See Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11a762.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2012) (providing the U.S. Supreme Court docket) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
326. See Supreme Court of the United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/021712zr1.pdf (providing the
U.S. Supreme Court order pending the case (citations omitted)).
327. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).
328. See id. at 908 (explaining the government’s interest in preventing quid
pro quo corruption).
329. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 63 (1976) (upholding contribution limits).
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even if it did, satisfied a compelling state interest in preserving
the integrity of the electoral process.330 Regardless of its reversal
before the U.S. Supreme Court, Western Tradition and other
cases331 blatantly refuting Citizens United might indicate a need
to limit corporate speech via independent expenditures on public
policy grounds. From here, perhaps a future Court of a different
composition or a constitutional amendment, however unlikely,
would serve to protect the public’s concerns.
B. Attacking the Court’s Application of Precedent
Another proper form of criticism would be that the Court
departed from, or misinterpreted, precedent.332 It seems virtually
impossible for the Court to properly interpret precedent when the
Court has never consistently subscribed to one corporate-rights
theory.333 One can criticize the court’s application of different
metaphors in various corporate-rights cases.334 With respect to
Citizens United, one can use this inconsistency to show that the
Court has not properly applied precedent because the precedent
itself lacked steady footing.335 Alternatively, one can attack the
precedent underlying the decision for its use of metaphysical
language. This analysis would likely involve a review of the

330. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 2011 MT 328, ¶ 48, 363
Mont. 220, 240, 271 P.3d 1, 13 (2011) (stating that when “applying the
principles enunciated in Citizens United, it is clear that Montana has a
compelling interest to impose the challenged rationally-tailored statutory
restrictions”).
331. See, e.g., Ognibene v. Parkes, No. 09-0994-CV, 2012 WL 89358, at *1
(2d Cir. Jan. 12, 2012) (finding that laws reducing the campaign contribution
limits restricting lobbyists’ contributions “are closely drawn to address the
significant governmental interest in reducing corruption or the appearance
thereof”).
332. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (explaining how the majority rejects precedent).
333. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 62 (observing that the Court has
frequently used the entity or aggregate theories as metaphors to interpret the
Constitution in the corporate context, but that the use has been ad hoc and
without regard to any simultaneous mutual exclusiveness among the theories).
334. See id. (criticizing the use of metaphors without regard for consistency).
335. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 33–41 (providing support for the realentity theory in the cases preceding Citizens United).
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Court’s use of statutory construction to interpret precedent or
statutory law.336
C. Attacking Public Policy as a Legal Basis in Itself
The strongest criticism, if not the lack of a strong policy
foundation, might be that the Court’s idea of policy is simply not
a good reason to rule in this way. Perhaps other options can
bypass the reliance on public policy arguments. Some people
(humans, no doubt) have advocated for “a constitutional
amendment that removes for-profit corporations from the speech
protections of the First Amendment.”337 Congress could
potentially effect a similar result pursuant to its Commerce
Clause authority by requiring a Federal Charter stipulating that
corporations do not have constitutional protection of personal
rights such as speech. Despite the overwhelming strength of
corporations in the lobbying sphere and in electioneering,338
individuals at least carry the right to vote if the majority
opposing Citizens United is truly overwhelming.
Although a basis in policy arguments can be weaker than one
in case or statutory law, policy can be very important in
situations involving the mass public, such as election law.339
Further, a primary check the public has on the U.S. Supreme
Court is to lobby the legislature after an unpopular ruling based
on policy or statutory grounds,340 a concept tainted by the fact
336. See, e.g., FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (applying a
construction analysis of the language in the statute).
337. Robert Weissman, Let the People Speak: The Case for a Constitutional
Amendment to Remove Corporate Speech from the Ambit of the First
Amendment, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 979, 980–81 (2011) (arguing for a constitutional
amendment after Citizens United).
338. See, e.g., OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ (last visited
Feb. 29, 2012) (providing data about lobbying expenditures) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
339. See, e.g., Robert W. Lee, Pre-Election Initiative Review in Florida: A
Framework for Analysis, 69 FLA. B.J. 14, 15 (1995) (discussing public policy
considerations regarding courts’ interfering with the election process).
340. See Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence
of Juries: Comparing the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrines,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1274 (1996) (discussing the legislature as a checking
function for the public).
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that lobbyists are often corporations or influenced by them.
Citizens United, however, based its ruling on the Constitution.341
This ups the ante for legislatures, and hence the public, to
challenge the ruling: it essentially requires another Court’s
decision overturning Citizens United or a constitutional
amendment.342 Therefore, if the Citizens United Court failed to
adequately justify its decision, and if the public’s fears
materialize, then policy might ultimately be sufficient grounds to
challenge the ruling.343
VI. Conclusion
The U.S. Supreme Court has equivocated and even, over
time, contradicted itself in its use of corporate-rights
metaphors.344 The Court has at times even succumbed to the
error of deducing functional corporate rights from some
metaphysical essence of a corporation.345 This foundation has
perpetuated the error because the public resounds the ruling
(with the compounded effect of a media spin),346 and it has alerted
the public to rightly question the Court’s conception of corporate
form. The public’s overwhelming criticism of Citizens United
reveals an important point in the discussion of corporate form:
the U.S. Supreme Court has provided inadequate guidance for its

341. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (stating that the
First Amendment does not give the government the authority to restrict
corporate political speech).
342. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1561, 1574–75 (1998) (discussing amendments to overturn Supreme Court
decisions).
343. See Weissman, supra note 337, at 980–81 (arguing for a constitutional
amendment after Citizens United).
344. See Krannich, supra note 36, at 62 (observing that the Court has
frequently used the entity or aggregate theories as metaphors to interpret the
Constitution in the corporate context, but that the use has been ad hoc and
without regard to any simultaneous mutual exclusiveness among the theories).
345. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (using the aggregate
view to justify personal due process protection).
346. See, e.g., PBS.ORG, supra note 183 (headlining an error that corporate
contributions are constitutional, as opposed to independent expenditures—to
which the anchors correctly refer).
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justification of the corporate right to speech.347 By virtue of the
Court’s failure to explain the source of the corporate right to
political speech, Citizens United has the unintended consequence
of revealing that corporate-rights theories are altogether
ineffective as inherent truths about corporations.348 (Still, with
precise language, commentators can use the theories in the
metaphysical sense to articulate justifications for various laws, so
long as the theories are not used as the source of those laws.)
With respect to independent expenditures, the Citizens United
Court finds the source of the corporate right not in some
metaphysical corporate essence, but rather in public policy.349
Many voices ought to be heard in the political sphere, and the
true protection of the public’s voice lies in proper discussion about
corporate theory and what we realistically want corporations to
be.350

347.
348.
349.
350.

See supra Part III (discussing Citizens United and its public impact).
See supra Part IV (revealing the error in Citizens United).
See supra Part IV.D (discussing policy as the source of the right).
See supra Part V (providing proper grounds of criticism).

